

# Hard Power, Soft Power: Toward a More Realistic Power Analysis

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## ABSTRACT

This article builds on the insights of critical approaches to the study of power and seeks to lay bare the poverty of power analysis in mainstream International Relations (IR). Part I presents a critical account of prevalent conceptions of 'hard power' in mainstream studies informed by realist IR and maintains that realism's power analysis is rather unrealistic insofar as it over-privileges material forms of power and focuses on the visible dimension of power relations to the neglect of the multiple (visible and non-visible) processes through which power is produced and expressed. Part II scrutinizes the concept of 'soft power'. While Nye's soft power analysis complements realist IR by highlighting non-material forms of power and looking at non-visible forms of power relations, it, too, remains shallow insofar as the production and various expressions of 'attraction' remain unaccounted for. Presenting more realistic accounts of the work power does in world politics requires following Lukes' footsteps to produce three- (if not four-) dimensional power analyses.

The centrality of power—in its various guises—to the theory and practice of world politics is impossible to overlook. What is often overlooked, however, are the less visible expressions of power that are difficult to examine in the ways in which one can observe and document the projection of military power. Merely focusing on the projection of military power, while useful on its own terms, has nevertheless impoverished our understanding of the productive role other forms of power play in world politics. While Nye's conceptualization of 'soft power' has gone some way towards remedying the paucity of mainstream accounts by pointing to the non-material forms power also takes,<sup>1</sup> it does not offer a theory of power that reflects upon its own moment(s) and site(s) of production and expression. The latter is also needed for offering more realistic accounts of the work power does in world politics.

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This article builds on the insights of critical approaches to the study of power<sup>2</sup> and seeks to lay bare the poverty of power analysis in mainstream International Relations (IR). It falls into two parts. Part I presents a critical account of prevalent conceptions of ‘hard power’ in mainstream studies informed by realist

IR and maintains that realism’s power analysis is rather unrealistic in two main ways. First, its narrow scope of inquiry over-emphasizes material forms of power, i.e. the military and economic capacity of states. Second, realist IR focuses on the visible dimension of power relations—the ‘first face of power’ in Lukes’<sup>3</sup> terms—to the neglect of the multiple (visible and non-visible) processes through which power is produced and expressed. Part II scrutinizes the concept of ‘soft power’ offered by Nye. Nye’s (soft) power analysis complements that of realist IR in two ways. First, it highlights non-material forms of power that are overlooked in realist power analysis. Second, in the attempt to capture the ways in which non-material power is expressed, it looks at non-visible forms of power relations—what Lukes refers to as the ‘second face of power’.<sup>4</sup> Nonetheless, Nye’s conception of ‘soft power’, too, remains shallow insofar as the production and various expressions of ‘attraction’ remain unaccounted for. Presenting more realistic accounts of the work power does in world politics requires following Lukes’ footsteps to produce three<sup>5</sup> (if not four)<sup>6</sup> dimensional power analyses.

## Hard Power

Realist IR takes power to be the most fundamental feature of world politics. In *The Twenty Years’ Crisis*, Carr warned against a neglect of power in international political analysis.<sup>7</sup> Morgenthau’s second principle of realism, as identified in *Politics Among Nations*, defined interest ‘in terms of power’.<sup>8</sup> Nevertheless, realism, apparently the one IR theory whose explanatory capacity revolves around ‘power’, has a surprisingly underdeveloped toolkit for power analysis.<sup>9</sup> In his 1998 book *The Power of Power Politics*, Vasquez scrutinized power politics in terms of its ability to “dominate the field of international relations inquiry” and “explain phenomena adequately”, and found it to be doing well in terms of the former but not the latter.<sup>10</sup> It is partly as a consequence of the persistence of a relatively underdeveloped state of power analysis in realist IR that students of world politics have adopted an essentialist concept of power and settled for substituting ‘the power argument’<sup>11</sup> for explanation. That is to say, they have

accounted for the dynamics of world politics with reference to ‘power’ without providing adequate explanation for or insight into understanding the work that power does.

That said, realist IR is not entirely to blame for the persistence of an unrealistic approach to power in mainstream accounts of world politics. Over the years, scholars of realist persuasion have sought to update their conception of power. Schelling, among others, highlights the importance of studying ‘communication’,<sup>12</sup> Baldwin underscores ‘relational’ aspects of power,<sup>13</sup> Walt calls for replacing the concept of ‘balance of power’ with ‘balance of threat’,<sup>14</sup> and Gilpin brings economic factors back in.<sup>15</sup> Still, these contributions fall short of rendering realist power analysis more realistic. Schelling’s understanding of communication often remains limited to signaling. Baldwin explains power with reference to its impact on the subject without due attention to variations in subjects’ perceptions of such impact. Walt’s notion of ‘balance of threat’ rests on a conception of threat as a product of power with an admixture of variables such as geographic proximity, offensive capabilities and perceived intentions. Like Baldwin, he too fails to explain variations in constructions of threat across space and time. Gilpin, in turn, neglects to provide a more thorough investigation of the components or relations of economic power, thereby offering little more than a non-military surrogate to the abovementioned ‘power argument’.

Notwithstanding the richness of the realist tradition<sup>16</sup> and scholarly attempts to further extend its horizons, accounts of world politics professedly informed by realism have continued to subscribe to an unrealistic notion of power as ‘hard’ and focused on its most visible expressions. Hence Bially Mattern’s lament that “when it comes to the practice of world politics (as opposed to scholarly reflection upon it) the received wisdom that guns and money are “hard” instruments still largely holds; they are thought to speak for themselves as coercive resources and thus to work most effectively”.<sup>17</sup> While realist IR cannot be blamed for the mistakes of supposedly realist policy wonks,<sup>18</sup> one should not overlook the unforeseen consequences of realism’s simplifications of an otherwise complex reality—as with defining interest in terms of power and reducing power analysis to counting ‘guns and bombs’.

The reasons behind these shortcomings are important to note. Mainstream IR has come to focus on ‘hard’ power either through classical realism’s materialist bias or neo-realism’s preference for economic methodology. As Schmidt explained:

[Waltz's] commitment to parsimony necessitates that he define power in terms of resources and, furthermore, that he assume that these resources are highly fungible. Waltz is most interested in providing a rank ordering of states so that he can ascertain the number of great powers in any given international system.<sup>19</sup>

More often than not, even those students of realism who distinguish between material and non-material forms of power have collapsed the latter into the former through the ontological, epistemological and methodological choices that they made. Ontologically, realism's choice of state as the principal actor in world politics has limited the scope of analysis in a way that did not allow for the studying of those outcomes caused by non-state actors.<sup>20</sup> Epistemologically and methodologically, realism associated itself with a certain understanding of 'doing science' akin to discovering those 'laws' that are assumed to govern social relations, and sought to base its conclusions on empirically verifiable 'facts'. Accordingly, it studied the only dimension of power that can be (seemingly) easily operationalized: military (and sometimes economic) capacity. The 'scientism' of realist IR, which rests on a narrow notion of science which no longer reigns in the natural or social sciences<sup>21</sup> has had consequences as articulated by Enloe:

The *raison d'être* for studying international politics... is *explanation*. One is on the trail of cause and effect. And when sorting out cause and effect, one has to be economical, discriminating... For an explanation to be useful, a great deal of human dignity has to be left on the cutting room floor.<sup>22</sup>

A preference for choices that favor explanation over understanding<sup>23</sup> has had consequences for the explanatory power of realism itself. Moreover, those factors that were left outside the research design of realist IR in favor of the more 'operationalizable' factors have found their way in through the back door, thereby resulting in a 'circular logic'. The problem with the circular logic of realist power analysis was identified by Haas<sup>24</sup> and Claude<sup>25</sup> as early as the 1950s and 1960s, and formulated more recently by Guzzini as follows: "on the one hand, [realist IR] claims that (the distribution of) power is the main criterion for the explanation of outcomes. On the other, in some cases, the outcomes are the main criterion for the assessment of power(s)".<sup>26</sup> This circular logic has appeared because neo-realist analysis considers actors' lack of capacity to visibly influence the systemic structure as lack of power. An analysis that explicitly focuses on outcomes (as opposed to mere capacity of actors to influence the systemic structure) would allow for the investigation of those outcomes that are not directly caused by actors, thereby revealing the role structures play in producing those outcomes and the invisible role of the actors therein (see below).<sup>27</sup>

Even for those who are willing to forsake understanding for explanation, fo-

ocusing only on the military form of power is unrealistic. For, as Mann reminds us, state power cannot be reduced to military power alone. This is not only because, as Mann puts it, “most historic states have not possessed a monopoly of organized military force and many have

not even claimed it”, but also because the international stratification of states (a concern central to neo-realism) in times of peace is better understood in terms of the ““political power structuring” of the wider international society that is not determined by military power”,<sup>28</sup> as seen in the cases of Japan or Germany. Both were stripped of their military prowess after the Second World War but were still able to affect outcomes.

What renders the realist conception of power ‘hard’ is not only its material focus but also the emphasis put on expressions of power as compulsion through direct interaction. Partly due to the aforementioned epistemological, ontological and methodological choices made by students of realism, their studies register only those expressions of power when ‘A gets B to do something that it would not otherwise do’. Initially formulated in 1957 by the political scientist Dahl,<sup>29</sup> this conception has informed power analysis in mainstream IR.<sup>30</sup> It is a conception which takes agents and sources of power as pre-constituted and focuses on instances of decision-making in visible conflict situations. However, as political scientists Bachrach and Baratz<sup>31</sup> argue in their 1962 classic “Two Faces of Power”, such analyses overlook those instances of power where actors are not constituted as parties to a conflict and/or issues are not defined as contentious. Take the case of North/South relations in post-‘Washington consensus’ world politics. That the South is no longer actively pushing for a ‘New International Economic Order’ as was the case during the 1970s, but has swallowed the ‘bitter pill’ of globalization and resorted to ‘structural adjustment’ cannot be taken as evidence that no power is exercised in this relationship. If power analysis were to focus only on those instances in which one actor gets to change another’s behavior following an articulation of grievances or an exchange of carrots and sticks between the two, only a fraction of power relationships worldwide could be analyzed.

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Nye not only introduces a new concept; he also calls on the United States to make more efficient use of its existing stockpile of soft power

Two-dimensional power analysis reminds students of IR to look out for power expressed through decision-making and *nondecision-making*. The latter is understood as “the practice of limiting the scope of actual decision-making to “safe” issues by manipulating...

dominant community values, myths,... political institutions and procedures”<sup>32</sup> By adopting a narrow conception of power, realist accounts fail to capture those instances of power being expressed, for example, when Norway and Canada punch above their (material) weight in *shaping* the world *agenda* on peacekeeping, or the international community’s *mobilization of bias* that has counted out economic sanctions against Iraq (1990-2003) when defining what is and is not ‘weapons of mass destruction’.<sup>33</sup> Important exceptions such as Krasner’s study on ‘regime power’ notwithstanding, two-dimensional power analysis has been absent from those ostensibly realist accounts of world politics. Krasner writes:

1. Power may be used to determine who can play the game in the first place. In international relations less powerful actors are often never invited to the table.
2. Power may also be used to dictate rules of the game, for instance, who gets to move first (...)
3. Power may also be used to change the payoff matrix (...) A larger importer (read the United States) might threaten to bar imports from an exporter (read Japan) if the latter failed to make basic changes in the structure of its domestic economy (...)<sup>34</sup>

On the whole, then, the fact that ‘compulsory power is not limited to material resources’<sup>35</sup> and the existence of those instances of nondecision-making through agenda setting and mobilization of bias<sup>36</sup> that also constitute expressions of power, seem to have escaped realist power analysis. Accordingly, students of realist IR have seen little need for two-dimensional power analysis. At best, the second face of power was considered to be an added extra that could electively be taken into account.<sup>37</sup>

This is not to underestimate the value of what realist power analysis delivers: expressions of power through direct use of material resources in cases of visible conflict. Rather, it is to claim that realist IR’s focus on understanding international relations as an effect of military power needs to be complemented with an understanding of military (and other forms of) power as an effect of international relations.<sup>38</sup> Only then would realist power analysis cease to underestimate the amount of power that is in effect at any time in world politics and begin producing more

realistic accounts of the work power does. Inclusion of the notion of ‘soft power’ in such analyses could be regarded as one such attempt.

## Soft Power

In 1990, Nye offered the notion of ‘soft power’ as a corrective to mainstream accounts of U.S. strength and influence, which, he thought, failed to account for one of the ways through which the U.S. gets what it wants: “attraction”.<sup>39</sup> What rendered soft power ‘soft’, according to Nye, was that its expression does not involve coercion via threats or inducement via payments. Presented as such, Nye’s conception of soft power was designed to remedy the narrow focus of realist power analysis (‘the ability to change what others do’) by bringing in the power of attraction (‘the ability to shape what others want’). Soft power does not constitute an alternative to hard power, as some seem to think;<sup>40</sup> rather, Nye’s (soft) power analysis complements that of realism. Nye explains the gist of his contribution as follows:

Hard and soft power are related because they are both aspects of the ability to achieve one’s purpose by affecting the behavior of others. The distinction between them is one of degree, both in the nature of the behavior and in the tangibility of the resources. Command power—the ability to change what others do—can rest on coercion or inducement. Co-optive power—the ability to shape what others want—can rest on the attractiveness of one’s own culture and values or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes others fail to express some preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic.<sup>41</sup>

Without underplaying the insight he provides into the bounds of U.S. power, it should nevertheless be stressed that Nye’s conception of soft power falls short of revealing the poverty of power analysis in mainstream accounts of world politics.

Perhaps Nye is not the best candidate for presenting such a critique, for he fails to inquire into his own core concept of ‘attraction’. This is rather unfortunate, because by doing so he replicates the essentialism of realist power analysis. Just as realist IR fails to look into the production of military power, Nye accepts as pre-given the stockpile of soft power, i.e. U.S. ‘attraction’, and focuses his account on the ways in which that stockpile could best be utilized. Admittedly, Nye assigns ‘two ontological statuses’ to attraction, as Mattern points out: “one as an essential condition and one as a result of social interaction”.<sup>42</sup> Still, throughout his analysis, Nye relies on the former and fails to push the latter to its full conclusion. Even as he identifies the sources of soft power as “the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideas and policies”,<sup>43</sup> Nye does not reflect upon how was it that U.S. culture, political ideas and policies came to be considered ‘attractive’ by the rest of the world.<sup>44</sup>

Nye's conception of soft power constitutes an improvement upon realist power analysis insofar as it raises the analyst's awareness of the 'second face of power'

Nye's silence on the production of soft power is somewhat surprising, as his agony over the decline of U.S. soft power during George W. Bush administration<sup>45</sup> suggests his cognizance of its variability.<sup>46</sup> Still, nowhere in his writings does Nye seek to inquire into the historical processes through which the 'attractive-

ness' of U.S. culture has been produced. Indeed, as Bially Mattern also points out, while Nye favors universal values over the parochial, he says "nothing about why universal values are the "right" ones or how one acquires such values."<sup>47</sup> Perhaps more importantly, Nye remains silent on the historical process through which particular values have come to be considered as *universal* and *right* and others have been rendered *parochial* and *less right*. An analysis of the attractiveness of U.S. culture and values that is historically and sociologically attentive to their production would inquire into soft power in terms of U.S. 'hegemony and domination'.<sup>48</sup> Failing that, stating a preference for soft power while relying on essentialist notions of culture and identity communicates a benign picture of U.S. hegemony and does not allow the capturing of 'not-so-soft' aspects of soft power (see below).<sup>49</sup>

On one level, there are no surprises here. Nye is not interested in inquiring into how the opponents of the U.S. are relegated to silence through various expressions of soft power. As the sub-title of his book (*Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics*) indicates, his is an unabashedly unreflexive take on the best ways to further U.S. 'success'.<sup>50</sup> In offering a particular conception of soft power, Nye not only introduces a new concept; he also calls on the United States to make more efficient use of its existing stockpile of soft power. That the kind of soft power he calls for the United States to utilize is 'not-so-soft' insofar as its effects on the rest of the world are concerned does not seem to worry him.

On another level, Nye's (soft) power analysis is problematic insofar as his own agenda of 'success in world politics' is concerned. This is not only because his analysis fosters the false impression that 'soft power' is a nice and cuddly surrogate to 'hard power', but also because he underestimates the extent to which U.S. soft power is produced and expressed through compulsion. After all, compulsory power is not limited to the use of material resources. Non-material forms of power, such as 'symbolic power', may also be used for the purpose of coercing another. Barnett's analysis of Arab politics is highly illuminating in this regard; during the Arab Cold War 'symbolic power' was used by 'radical' Arab states to bring into

line their 'conservative' counterparts by touting the attractiveness of 'Arab nationalism' for Arab peoples across the Middle East.<sup>51</sup> By failing to inquire into how the production and expression of soft power can also cause harm, Nye does disservice to both his power analysis and his agenda for U.S. 'success' in world politics.

To recapitulate, in Part I we pointed to the poverty of realist power analysis for taking agents as well as the stockpile of power as pre-given and focusing on decision-making in cases of visible conflict. Following Lukes, we called for adopting Bachrach and Baratz's conception of two-dimensional power, which would allow looking at instances of decision-making and nondecision-making. Nye's conception of soft power constitutes an improvement upon realist power analysis insofar as it raises the analyst's awareness of the 'second face of power'. For, the very notion of 'attraction' suggests that there is a conflict of interest that does not come to the surface. That is to say, B does not express its grievances and does what A wants it to do, because it is attracted to A's culture, political values and/or foreign policy. That said, Nye's analysis rests on a conception of power that is somehow less than three-dimensional. While Nye encourages the analyst to be curious about those instances of power expression where there is no visible conflict and/or clash of interests, his failure to register how soft power is 'not-so-soft' means that his (soft) power analysis does not fully capture the 'third face of power'. Let us clarify.

Lukes understands the 'third face of power' as those instances when "A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping, or determining his very wants".<sup>52</sup> Post-colonial peoples' post-WWII rush towards sovereign statehood may be viewed as an example of the 'third face of power' whereby the international society shaped their wants while their actual circumstances called for other forms of political community. That is to say, in Lukes' framework, B does what A wants in apparent readiness contrary to its own interests. Put differently, by exercising soft power, A prevents B from recognizing its own 'real interests'.

While Nye's attention to A's ability to shape B's *wants* seem to render his analysis three-dimensional, his lack of curiosity into 'not-so-soft' expressions of U.S. power renders his (soft) power analysis two-and-a-half dimensional. This is mostly because Nye assumes that B's 'real interests' are also served when it follows A's lead. It is true that soft power does not involve physical coercion, but as Lukes reminded us, it is

the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no

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alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial.<sup>53</sup>

Going back to the example of North/South relations, power is involved not only when the South does not express its grievance because of the absence of opportunities to do so, but also when it

seemingly has no grievances as a consequence of the prevalent system of ideas that depoliticizes its status within the international economic order.<sup>54</sup> In a similar fashion, Nye is not interested in inquiring into the sources of U.S. ‘attraction’, for he considers the U.S.’s ability to shape the wants of others as befitting the latter’s ‘real interests’. Accordingly, he misses a ‘fundamental part of soft power’, what Bohas describes as “the early shaping of taste, collective imaginary and ideals which constitutes a way of dominating other countries. This includes the reinforcing effect of the social process in favor of American power through goods and values.”<sup>55</sup> As such, Nye’s analysis remains limited in regard to the *third face of soft power*, where the existing state of things is internalized by the actors, and the U.S.’s expression of power seems benign and in accordance with the ‘real interests’ of others.

In sum, the limits of Nye’s approach, which could be characterized as ‘two-and-a-half dimensional power analysis’, does not allow him to offer a theory of power that reflects upon its own moment(s) and site(s) of production and ‘not-so-soft’ expression. This is not to underestimate what Nye’s (soft) power analysis delivers. Rather, our aim has been to push his analysis further towards generating a more realistic framework where one’s scope of research is not limited to the acts or inacts of actors but investigates how different actors’ needs and wants as well as their understanding of themselves and their ‘real interests’ are shaped by other actors or by the existing structures.

### **Toward a More Realistic (Hard/Soft) Power Analysis**

While the realist conception of power has come to shape mainstream accounts of world politics, critical scholars have pointed with vigor to the increasingly unrealistic analysis it delivers. Underscoring the limits of realist power analysis, Caporaso’s study of ‘structural power’<sup>56</sup> points to the difference between dependence as a corollary of interstate relations and dependency as a structural feature of the existing world order; i.e. less developed countries find themselves in a ‘limited’ choice situation due to the structure of the capitalist international economy. Strange’s focus on international political economy highlights the role of global

markets as an arena where power is exercised by actors other than the state in that ‘structural power decides outcomes (both positive and negative) much more than relational power does.’<sup>57</sup> Guzzini, in turn, points to the ‘impersonal part of the power phenomena’, which he calls ‘governance’. Although both power and governance are needed for a comprehensive power analysis, he argued, the concept of power should remain attached to agents/actors so that an actor’s responsibilities and possible actions for emancipatory change would become more visible.<sup>58</sup>

Since power shapes the formation of actors’ consciousness, no interest formation can be objective; defining what an actor’s ‘real interests’ are is not free of power relations

With the aim of rendering power analysis more realistic, we should open up to new research agendas as required by the multiple faces of power. Power is far too complex in its sources, effects and production to be reduced to one dimension.<sup>59</sup> Indeed, power is diffused and enmeshed in the social world in which people live in such a way that there are no relations exempt from power.<sup>60</sup> Since power shapes the formation of actors’ consciousness, no interest formation can be objective;<sup>61</sup> defining what an actor’s ‘real interests’ are is not free of power relations. That is to say, not only the mobilization of bias and agenda-setting but also the production and effects of all norms and values that shape human consciousness should be critically scrutinized. This, in turn, calls for not three- but four-dimensional power analysis – “Lukes plus Foucault” – as dubbed by Guzzini.<sup>62</sup> Contra Lukes, whose three-dimensional power analysis rests on assumptions regarding (1) the possibility of uncovering power relations, and (2) B’s objective (‘real’) interests that A denies through various expressions of hard and soft power, Foucault maintains that ‘power and knowledge directly imply one another... [in that] there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.’<sup>63</sup>

The academic field of International Relations constitutes a supreme example of the workings of the ‘fourth face of power’. Over the years, students of IR have studied international relations as an effect of power. It is only recently that they have begun to study power as an effect of international relations (as world politics)<sup>64</sup> and International Relations (as an academic field).<sup>65</sup> However, as Booth reminds us, such silences, as with IR’s narrow conception of power, “are not natural, they are political. Things do not just happen in politics, they are made to happen,

whether it is globalization or inequality. Grammar serves power”.<sup>66</sup> One of the sites where the productive effects of grammar in the service of power is most visible is the ‘Third World’. This has been one of the central themes of postcolonial studies where “[f]rom Fanon to Jan Mahomed to Bhabha, the connecting theme is that Western representations construct meaning and ‘reality’ in the Third World. Concepts such as “progress”, “civilized” and “modern” powerfully shape the non-European world”.<sup>67</sup> The ways in which grammar serves power becomes detectable through more realistic power analysis.

More realistic power analysis requires looking at instances of:<sup>68</sup>

- a. A getting B to do what it wants in the event of a visible conflict;
- b. A getting B to do what it wants in the absence of a visible articulation of grievances during a visible conflict;
- c. A getting B to do what it wants by shaping B’s wants and needs so that a visible conflict does not occur;
- d. A getting B to do what it wants by constituting the field of knowledge through which B realizes its subjectivity.<sup>69</sup>

It is in this last sense that IR has been complicit in the ways in which grammar has served power. If “power rolls out of the mouths of men, as well as the barrels of guns”,<sup>70</sup> it is high time for more realistic power analyses that reflect upon their own moment(s) and site(s) of production and expression.

## Endnotes

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2. Stefano Guzzini, “Structural Power: the Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis,” *International Organization*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (1993), pp. 443-478; Cynthia Enloe, “Margins, Silences and Bottom Rungs: How to Overcome the Underestimation of Power in the Study of International Relations,” *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, eds. Ken Booth, Steve Smith and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 186-202; G. Chowdhry and S. Nair, eds., *Power, Postcolonialism, and International Relations: Reading Race, Gender, and Class* (London: Routledge, 2002); Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” *International Organization*, Vol. 59 (Winter 2005), pp. 39-75; Stefano Guzzini, “The Concept of Power: A Constructivist Analysis,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (2005), pp. 495-521; Janice Bially Mattern, “Why ‘Soft Power’ Isn’t So Soft: Representational Force and the Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (2005), pp. 583-612.

3. Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View*, (London: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 11-15.
4. Lukes, *Power*, pp. 16-20.
5. Lukes, *Power*, pp. 21-25.
6. Peter Digeser, "The Fourth Face of Power," *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 54, No. 4 (1992), pp. 977-1007; Guzzini, "Structural power."
7. Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1933: an Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, (New York: Palgrave, 2001 [1940]). But see: Barnett and Duvall, "Power in International Politics," pp. 66-69.
8. Hans J. Morgenthau *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, (New York,: Knopf, 1954). But see: Michael C. Williams, "Why Ideas Matter in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism, and the Moral Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization*, Vol. 58, No. 4 (2004), pp. 633-65.
9. Marxism, feminism and postcolonial studies (and increasingly constructivist approaches) also put emphasis on power analysis. Yet, over the years, realism has misguidedly been identified as the one IR theory that focuses on power.
10. John A. Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics: from Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.13.
11. The way it works, according to Guzzini, is that "instead of opening analysis, the power argument becomes its final stroke. From being a possible help, it becomes a hindrance for understanding". Guzzini, "Structural Power," p.478.
12. Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).
13. David Baldwin, "Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis," *International Organization*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Autumn 1980), pp. 471-506.
14. Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1990).
15. Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
16. Brian C. Schmidt, "Competing Realist Conceptions of Power," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (2005), pp. 523-549.
17. Bially Mattern, "Why "Soft Power" Isn't So Soft," p.587.
18. Consider Mearsheimer's despair over the U.S. war on Iraq. See John J Mearsheimer, "Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq war: Realism versus Neo-conservatism," *OpenDemocracy*, May 2005. Online. Available at <<http://www.opendemocracy.net>> Accessed May 6, 2008.
19. Schmidt "Competing Realist Conceptions of Power," p. 537.
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21. See, *inter alia*, Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); Mark J. Smith, *Social Science in Question*, (London: Open University Press, 1998).
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31. Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 56, No. 4 (1962), p.948.
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33. Since the economic sanctions program for Iraq began, "an estimated 500,000 Iraqi children under the age of five have died as a result of the sanctions", which, Gordon notes, is "almost three times as many as the number of Japanese killed during the U.S. atomic bomb attacks". See Joy Gordon, "Cool War: Economic Sanctions as a Weapon of Mass Destruction," *Harper's Magazine*, November 2002, pp. 43-49.
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35. Barnett and Duvall, "Power in International Politics," p.50. Also see the discussion below and in endnote 51.
36. Bachrach and Baratz, "Two Faces of Power."
37. See, for example, Jeffrey Hart, "Three Approaches to the Measurement of Power in International Relations," *International Organization*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Spring, 1976), pp. 289-305.
38. And the globalisation of world politics. See Tarak Barkawi, *Globalization and War*, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005).
39. Nye, "Soft Power."
40. See, for example, Robert Cooper, "Hard Power, Soft Power and the Goals of Diplomacy" in David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, eds., *American Power in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, (London: Polity Press, 2004), pp. 167-180; Kurt M. Campbell and Michael E. O'Hanlon, eds., *Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security* (Cambridge, MA: Basic Books, 2006).
41. Nye, *Soft Power*, p.7.
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46. The decline of U.S. soft power is captured in the following, among others: Tony Judt, "Its

Own Worst Enemy," *The New York Review of Books*, Vol. 49, No. 13 (August 15 2002), pp. 12-17; Sharif Shuja, "Why America Cannot Ignore Soft Power," *Contemporary Review*, Spring 2008, pp. 16-22.

47. Mattern, "Why "Soft Power" Isn't So Soft," p.588.

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49. Mattern, "Why "Soft Power" Isn't So Soft."

50. On reflexivity in power analysis, see Guzzini, "The Concept of Power," pp. 513-515.

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52. Lukes, *Power*, p.23.

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54. As articulated in Robert W. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer 1983), p. 172.

55. Bohas "The Paradox of Anti-Americanism," p.409.

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58. Guzzini, "Structural Power."

59. Barnett and Duvall, "Power in International Politics," p. 67. Also see Anna M. Agathangelou and L.H.M. Ling, "Power, Borders, Security, Wealth: Lessons of Violence and Desire from September 11," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 48, No. 3 (2004), pp. 517-538.

60. Digeser, "The Fourth Face of Power," p. 980-81

61. Lukes also made a similar point on consciousness and false consciousness on the 2<sup>nd</sup> edition of his book. See Steven Lukes, *Power: a Radical View*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

62. Guzzini, "The Concept of Power," p.496. On Foucault's conception of power, see Mark Bevir, "Foucault, Power and Institutions," *Political Studies*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (1999), pp. 345-359.

63. Foucault quoted in Digeser, "The Fourth Face of Power," p.986.

64. See, for example, Barnett and Duvall, "Power in International Politics."

65. See Anna M. Agathangelou and L.H.M. Ling, "The House of IR: From Family Power Politics to the *Poisies* of Worldism," *International Studies Review*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (2004) , pp. 21-50; Pinar Bilgin, "Thinking Past "Western" IR," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2008), pp. 5-23.

66. Ken Booth, *Theory of World Security*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p.160.

67. Philip Darby and A.J. Paolini, "Bridging International Relations and Postcolonialism," *Alternatives*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (1994), p.387.

68. The first three are adapted from Lukes, *Power*. The fourth one builds on the insights of Digeser, "The Fourth Face of Power"; Guzzini, "Structural Power"; Guzzini "The Concept of Power";

Booth, *Theory of World Security*.

69. This is not to reduce expressions of power to relations between two actors. There are always multiple agents and structures of power at work at multiple planes.

70. Booth, *Theory of World Security*, p.241.