

CHAPTER TWO

FROM INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY TO INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

This book explores the realm of international political life that occupies a middle ground between the anarchy characteristic of international politics and the order characteristic of national politics. This is the realm of *international society*.

As a starting point, this book shares the realist assumption that states reside in a Hobbesian international system whose default equilibrium is one of pervasive geopolitical competition. But it parts company with realism in positing that even if competition is endemic to global politics, it can nonetheless be overcome. As the international system matures, a Hobbesian world can give way to a Lockean world—one in which the practice of reciprocity and the fashioning of political compacts curb rivalry. Thereafter, the international system has the potential to evolve to a Deutschian world—one in which an international society based on communal norms and identities eliminates geopolitical competition and provides a foundation for stable peace.¹

The logic of international society represents a synthesis of the logics of international politics and that of national politics. In the realm of international politics, each state is self-regarding and sovereign, all embrace oppositional identities, and order, to the extent it exists, emerges from the exercise of power. In the realm of national politics, sovereignty is unitary, identity is common, and order emerges from the institutionalization of power—as articulated by Max Weber and other theorists of the state. International society is located at the intersection of these two realms, containing characteristics of both. In this Deutschian middle ground, states exercise an attenuated form of sovereignty, identity is communal but not common, and order emerges

¹ See Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957).

from the binding and bounding of power rather than its exercise or its institutionalization. In a society of states, the social character of interstate relations overrides the rules of anarchic competition and power balancing—even if it does not entail the mature institutions of governance and the bureaucracy associated with the unitary state. Figure 2.1 presents a conceptual mapping of these different political logics.

International society has been the subject of important scholarly work, much of it part of the so-called English School.² In keeping with the tradition of the English School, this book privileges no single theoretical approach. Rather, the analysis is explicitly eclectic and synthetic in nature, seeking to draw insights from multiple paradigms rather than defend any single one. The exploration of stable peace, as many other issues tackled by scholars of international politics, has suffered from the intellectual barriers that accompany theoretical divides. Realist accounts tend to be pitted against liberal ones, and rationalist accounts against constructivist alternatives. As a consequence, insufficient attention has been paid to approaches that cut across paradigmatic boundaries. This study explicitly seeks to transcend these barriers. Because the process under study is a dynamic one—how interstate relations move along a continuum from endemic competition, to halting cooperation, to lasting friendship—theoretical eclecticism is a necessity; at different stages in the onset of stable peace, quite different political and social processes are at work.

At least on the surface, the phenomenon in question represents a *prima facie* rejection of realism; the emergence of zones of peace confounds a paradigm that posits that international competition is inescapable and conceives of international change exclusively in terms of shifts in the distribution of material power. The inadequacy of a realist approach to stable peace is self-evident; the mere existence of a zone of peace invalidates realism's central

² Among the main theoretical traditions in International Relations, the English School is the one that has most advanced scholarship about international society. Perhaps the most influential book in this tradition is Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (London: MacMillan, 1977). For Bull, "A *society of states* (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive of themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions" (p. 13). Other scholars working in this tradition include Barry Buzan and Richard Little. See Barry Buzan and Richard Little, *International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

	International Politics				International Society			National Politics	
Thinker	Hobbes		Locke		Deutsch			Weber	
Organizing Principle	Anarchy	Balance of Power	Hegemony	Contingent Cooperation	Rapprochement	Security Community	Federal Union	Unitary State	
Character of Sovereignty	Hard Sovereignty				Attenuated or Pooled Sovereignty			Conjoined or Single Sovereignty	
Character of Relations	Interstate				Trans-State			Supra-State or Unitary	
Source of Order	Order from the Exercise of Power				Order from Binding and Co-binding Power			Order from the Institutionalization of Power	
Nature of Identity	Oppositional Identity				Communal Identity			Common Identity	

FIGURE 2.1 The Logics of International Politics, International Society, and National Politics

tenets. It is also the case, however, that realist concerns figure prominently in the story that unfolds in the following pages. Indeed, the historical cases reveal that strategic necessity and adjustments to adverse shifts in the material distribution of power initially drive the process of reconciliation that ultimately leads to stable peace.

In contrast to realism, the liberal tradition has begun to map the borderlands between the realms of international politics and international society. A centerpiece of liberalism's research agenda, after all, has been to examine how institutions, international law, ideational convergence, and regime type can tame the international system, mute its competitive incentives, and promote cooperation. Nonetheless, liberalism still adheres to a conceptual framework in which the international system is comprised of self-regarding, sovereign states—even if it submits that instruments are available to induce discrete episodes of international collaboration. The emergence of zones of peace entails a far deeper transformation in interstate relations than that envisaged by liberals.³ Stable peace is ultimately the product not of the rationalist calculations that predominate in the liberal paradigm, but of societal bonds that endow interstate relations with a social character.

Inasmuch as this book is about profound change in international politics, the constructivist school's insights about the ability of changes in state identity to facilitate transformation of the international system make it a natural theoretical starting point. Furthermore, constructivism recognizes the social character of interstate relations and therefore is well-equipped to theorize about international society. Nonetheless, constructivist accounts of international society often distance themselves too far from the material notions of power that inform realism and liberalism, thereby overlooking the important role played by rationalist conceptions of geopolitical necessity. In addition, many constructivists leave unanswered important questions of when and how changes in state identity take place and make possible the emergence of international society.⁴

³ As Barry Buzan observes, the notion of international society "has some parallels to regime theory, but is much deeper, having constitutive rather than merely instrumental implications." Buzan, *From International to World Society?* p. 7.

⁴ In his *Social Theory of International Politics*, Alexander Wendt posits that international anarchy can take three different forms: Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian. In broad terms, this perspective is consonant with this book's argument that groups of states can move from a violent Hobbesian setting, through the building of a Lockean compact based on reciprocity, to a Deutschian society characterized by communal identity. (The empirical cases suggest that re-

In seeking to build bridges across theoretical divides—rather than pitting paradigms against each other—this book concentrates on two specific linkages. One is a realist-constructivist synthesis. Here, the central question is the mediating role of perceptions of intent, motivation, political character, and identity in shaping how states react to concentrations of material power. The standard realist account suggests that states balance against other centers of power when they can, and bandwagon when they must. This book embraces this central realist insight. The initial step toward reconciliation is a form of bandwagoning; one state accommodates another because strategic deficiency makes balancing unappealing. This move is motivated by strategic necessity and objective national interests, not intersubjectively constituted meanings.

Nonetheless, constructivist concerns about practice, discourse, and identity are needed to explain why an initial act of accommodation can ultimately result in stable peace. A process that begins with strategic bargaining ends with societal integration and identity change, enabling states to see each other as benign polities. When states see each other as benign, then concentrations of material power, rather than constituting a source of threat, can serve as a vehicle for the spread of shared norms and a magnet around which international society can form. This book thus combines rationalist insights about the role that diplomatic signaling plays in moderating uncertainty with constructivist insights about the role that practice and discourse play in changing identity to explain how the mutual attribution of benignity takes place and contributes to the onset of stable peace.

A synthesis between liberalism and constructivism is the second key linkage explored in this book. The phenomenon under study is not just the absence of war, but a deeper and more durable peace. Liberalism alone is adequate to explain the absence of war; the democratic peace literature contains a wealth of both normative and institutional arguments about the pacific quality of relations among democracies. Exploring stable peace requires a further analytic step, one capable of explaining how polities build societal

gime type is not a necessary determinant of stable peace, hence the preference for a Deutschian focus on communal identity instead of a Kantian focus on republican government.) Nonetheless, Wendt's discussion does little to explain the mechanisms by which states transition between these different forms of anarchy. In subsequent work, Wendt does offer a teleological model of progression through these conditions of anarchy. For further discussion, see note 80 below. Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chap. 6; and Alexander Wendt, "Why a World State Is Inevitable," *European Journal of International Relations* 9, no. 4 (2003).

bonds with each other, embrace communal identities, and, in some cases, merge into a unitary state and enjoy the social solidarity that comes with union. As the process of building stable peace moves from the rationalist to the sociological—from the early stages of signaling benign intent to the later stages of social construction—a liberal-constructivist synthesis is essential.

This inquiry into stable peace is not intended to advance a particular claim about the ontological content of political life, nor does it aspire to theoretical unity. Rather, it draws on a combination of rationalist and sociological processes, and realist, liberal, and constructivist explanations. It simply endeavors to describe the formation of zones of stable peace as accurately as possible.

THE EXISTING LITERATURE ON STABLE PEACE

Despite the subject's theoretical and practical importance, little is known about how and when zones of peace form and endure. The topic has received scant scholarly attention partly because zones of stable peace are uncommon; even in parts of the world where international conflict is rare, such as South America, international tension has been the rule and comity the exception. In addition, scholars have paid insufficient attention to instances of stable peace precisely because they are peaceful and therefore often overlooked. Inasmuch as zones of peace do not draw attention to themselves—they represent non-events or the dog that does not bark—they are chronically understudied. As Thomas Hardy quipped, “War makes rattling good history; but Peace is poor reading.”⁵

The main body of literature directly relevant to the study of stable peace focuses on security communities—groupings of states that have succeeded in escaping geopolitical rivalry. The literature on security communities took shape in the 1950s under the guidance of Karl W. Deutsch. He oversaw a multiauthored project, containing numerous case studies, which remains unpublished.⁶ The main published product is *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Deutsch's pioneering volume that served as the foundation for

⁵ Thomas Hardy, *The Dynasts: An Epic-Drama of the War with Napoleon* (London: Macmillan, 1920), p. 71.

⁶ Karl W. Deutsch, *Backgrounds for Community: Case Studies in Large-Scale Political Unification*, unpublished manuscript.

future research on security community.⁷ Deutsch's agenda was largely set aside during the Cold War, which encouraged scholars to focus on the study of conflict and deterrence rather than cooperative security. As a consequence, the literature on security community did not significantly advance until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since the Cold War's end, two collaborative volumes have explicitly returned to Deutsch's agenda. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett published *Security Communities* in 1998. Two years later, Arie Kacowicz, Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, Ole Elgström, and Magnus Jerneck published *Stable Peace Among Nations*.⁸ Other authors who have made significant contributions to the literature include Kenneth Boulding, Stephen Rock, and Bruce Cronin.⁹ The following chronological overview highlights the main conceptual insights of each of these authors.¹⁰

Although the notion of security community was initially proposed by Richard Van Wagonen in the early 1950s, it was not until the 1957 publication of Deutsch's *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* that the concept was developed in a systematic fashion. Deutsch defines a security community as a grouping in which there exists a "real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically." He distinguishes between pluralistic and amalgamated security communities (unions), offering a primarily transactional account of their formation. Communication and economic and social interaction are the primary vehicles through

⁷ Deutsch, *Political Community*.

⁸ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Arie Kacowicz, Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, Ole Elgström, and Magnus Jerneck, eds., *Stable Peace Among Nations* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000).

⁹ Kenneth Boulding, *Stable Peace* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978); Stephen R. Rock, *Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989); Stephen R. Rock, *Appeasement in International Politics* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2000); Bruce Cronin, *Community Under Anarchy: Transnational Identity and the Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

¹⁰ Two other literatures are directly relevant to the study of stable peace: work on unions and on democratic peace. Although I do not survey these literatures, I do draw extensively on them later in this chapter. On unions, see, for example, Murray Forsyth, *Unions of States: The Theory and Practice of Confederation* (New York: Leicester University Press and Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1981). Work on democratic peace devolves from Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay, in M. Campbell Smith, trans. and ed. (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1903). The notion of democratic peace is not synonymous with the notion of stable peace. Democratic peace is about the absence of war. Stable peace runs much deeper; it is about the demilitarization of interstate relations and the elimination of geopolitical competition. Nonetheless, the democratic peace literature does provide rich theoretical and empirical material for studying stable peace.

which security community evolves, with transaction flows and integration incrementally leading to “mutual sympathy and loyalties,” a “we feeling,” and “partial identification in terms of self-images and interests.”¹¹ Deutsch identifies several conditions that help groupings of states move toward mutual expectations of peaceful change: initial perceptions of a common threat, the presence of a dominant state that takes the lead in promoting integration, compatible values, and responsive and effective institutions of governance.

Although Deutsch presents a primarily transactional and functionalist account of the onset of stable peace, his analysis in several respects does lay a foundation for alternative approaches. His focus on national self-images and the evolution of a “we feeling” broaches the question of changing identities—a matter of central concern to constructivists such as Adler and Barnett. Deutsch also recognizes the role played by substate actors, noting that interest groups inside individual states as well as class-based alliances that span national boundaries help drive forward the process of integration. Finally, Deutsch’s study foreshadows the importance of strategic restraint—particularly with respect to major powers. He observes that states are more willing to let down their guard and compromise their autonomy if confident that their stronger partners are prepared to afford them voice and influence in shaping communal arrangements. Deutsch found that pluralistic security communities are easier to attain and preserve than amalgamated ones precisely because they allow their members greater autonomy.¹²

The next major work on zones of peace came over twenty years later with the publication of Kenneth Boulding’s *Stable Peace*. Four of the five chapters in the book are drawn from public lectures, making the book more of a reflection on the subject of stable peace than a systematic analysis. Boulding’s approach is close to that of Deutsch. His definition of stable peace tracks Deutsch’s: “a situation in which the probability of war is so small that it does not really enter into the calculations of any of the people involved.”¹³ He also agrees with Deutsch that “compatible self-images” and “the rise of travel and communication” are important elements of stable peace.¹⁴ Boulding makes a noteworthy contribution in helping to identify the political dy-

¹¹ Deutsch, *Political Community*, pp. 5, 36.

¹² On substate actors, see Deutsch, *Political Community*, pp. 176–179; on restraint and autonomy, see pp. 30–31, 40, 66.

¹³ Boulding, *Stable Peace*, p. 13.

¹⁴ Boulding, *Stable Peace*, pp. 17–18, 63.

namics at work in the early stages of reconciliation. Whereas Deutsch focuses principally on communication and integration as triggering processes, Boulding's work, like the approach of this book, points to the importance of mutual concessions, suggesting that reciprocal accommodation plays a key role in leading the parties "toward compatibility of national images."¹⁵

Stephen Rock's 1989 book on great-power rapprochement contributed to the study of stable peace in three respects.¹⁶ First, Rock isolates episodes of rapprochement from the broader phenomenon of stable peace, thereby focusing attention on the critical pairings of states that often serve as the core group around which wider zones of peace take shape. Second, he hypothesizes that states whose economies and geopolitical interests are complementary rather than homogenous are best poised to pursue rapprochement. Integration between heterogeneous economies (for example, a producer of raw materials and a manufacturing state) produces mutual gains, while integration between similar economies (for example, two manufacturing economies) leads to competitive clashes of interest. The same logic leads Rock to claim that a naval power and a land power are better suited for rapprochement than two land powers, the latter more likely to have conflicting strategic interests. Third, Rock argues that states are able to engage in rapprochement only when they have similar political systems and ideological orientations. Political similarity promotes a sense of communal identity and affinity, whereas political difference sustains mutual suspicion and ideological rivalry.

In their 1998 book, *Security Communities*, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett return to Deutsch's original research agenda, seeking to advance theoretical inquiry into the onset of stable peace and to compile additional empirical material through the inclusion of eight case study chapters.¹⁷ They bring a fresh theoretical lens—constructivism—to the subject, providing them the conceptual tools needed to move well beyond Deutsch's transactional account of security community. In particular, constructivism's core concerns with norms, ideational change, and identity enable Adler and Barnett to explore in greater depth Deutsch's underdeveloped discussion of national self-image and mutual perceptions of we-ness. By focusing on how practices and institutions bring about new understandings of reality as well

¹⁵ Boulding, *Stable Peace*, pp. 112–113.

¹⁶ Rock, *Why Peace Breaks Out*.

¹⁷ Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*. The following summary draws on chapters 1–2.

as shared meanings and identities, they deepen conceptualization of the sociological dimensions of stable peace.

Adler and Barnett also advance exploration of the processes through which security communities form and the conditions that favor their onset. As to the processes that lead to security community, they identify three stages of evolution: nascent, ascendant, and mature. During the nascent phase, states respond to a shared threat or other common stimulus by banding together and interacting with increasing frequency and intensity. During the ascendant phase, transactions intensify, norms of multilateralism become institutionalized, and these institutions serve as engines for social learning—“an active process of redefinition or reinterpretation of reality.”¹⁸ During the mature phase, social networks thicken and the parties come to enjoy mutual trust and a common identity, laying the foundation for dependable expectations of peaceful change.

As to the conditions that facilitate the formation of security communities, Adler and Barnett agree with Deutsch that a common external threat often provides the initial incentive for a group of states to band together. They also support Deutsch’s finding that a dominating power usually leads the way, although they focus on the ability of a major power to project shared norms and understandings and not only wield material preponderance. Importantly, Adler and Barnett suggest that liberal democracies may be better suited to participate in security communities than other types of polities due to their susceptibility to socialization and their ability to embrace shared norms. They propose that liberal democracy, while not a necessary condition for the formation of security community, may play a prominent role in facilitating the onset of stable peace.

In *Community Under Anarchy*, Bruce Cronin adopts a constructivist approach similar to that of Adler and Barnett. For Cronin, stable peace depends on the spread of a transnational identity, which “can transform an egoistic definition of self to one based on membership in a conceptual social group.”¹⁹ As the members of such a grouping embrace a transnational identity, they are likely to define their interests in common and to embrace a shared set of guiding norms. Cronin identifies three main conditions that are necessary for a transnational identity to form: a shared characteristic, such as

¹⁸ Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*, p. 43.

¹⁹ Cronin, *Community Under Anarchy*, p. 19.

a common ethnicity, region, or regime type; exclusivity as to the shared characteristic; and a high level of positive interdependence among the states in question. Cronin examines security communities (the Concert of Europe) as well as unions (Germany and Italy), adding to the empirical breadth of his study.

In *Stable Peace Among Nations*, Arie Kacowicz and his co-authors claim a conceptual middle ground between Deutsch's transactional approach and the constructivist account of Adler and Barnett.²⁰ For Kacowicz, the onset of stable peace results from cognitive learning and the development of a shared normative framework that enables partner states to develop mutual expectations of peaceful change. "Each party learns that it is dependent upon the other to assure its security," leading to "a mutual interest in establishing and maintaining the peace between them. . . . This change in the perception of the national interest means that the parties regard war as an illegitimate instrument for attaining national objectives."²¹ Positive consequences follow from building reconciliation, including substantial increases in trade and societal integration. Within this framework, the onset of expectations of peaceful change precedes, rather than results from, societal integration.

As for the conditions that enable this cognitive awakening and the consequent redefinition of national interests, the authors identify the presence of stable political regimes whose behavior is predictable and consistent, mutual satisfaction with the status quo, and open channels of communication. Like Adler and Barnett, Kacowicz and his collaborators see liberal democracy as a factor that facilitates, but is not a necessary condition for, the onset of stable peace.

Realism Revisited

In light of realism's insistence on the pervasive nature of geopolitical rivalry, it should come as no surprise that all of the existing literature on stable peace lies outside the realist tradition. The works just reviewed reside in the liberal or constructivist traditions—and many of them draw on insights gleaned from the literature on the democratic peace. However, one strand of realism,

²⁰ Kacowicz published previous works on the subject, including Arie Kacowicz, *Zones of Peace in the Third World: South America and West Africa in Comparative Perspective* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998).

²¹ Kacowicz et al., *Stable Peace Among Nations*, p. 25.

although it does not explicitly address the question of stable peace, is nonetheless directly relevant. This is the literature on threat perception and state type. Work in this area is rich and broad-ranging; the following is a selective survey intended only to provide a conceptual foundation for a more in-depth discussion later in this chapter.

Balance-of-power logic provides the analytic foundation for realism's insistence on the endemic nature of international rivalry. In an anarchic and self-help world, any state that seeks to amass superior power automatically provokes other states to balance in response. Stephen Walt amends this central tenet of the realist canon by proposing that states balance against threats rather than power per se, with perceptions of threat derived from assessment of both capability and intent.²² Walt does not take full advantage of the conceptual opening that resulted from his focus on threats rather than material capability alone; he claims that states base their assessment of intent primarily on material variables such as geography and the propensity of states to maintain offensive force postures. But his work does bring the question of intent into the picture, logically raising the possibility that states that perceive each other as having nonthreatening intent might be able to defy realism's insistence on the intractable nature of geopolitical competition.

Others have sought to extend the logical implications of Walt's focus on intent. Walt's student, David Edelstein, for example, examines how states assess the intentions of other states and how those assessments in turn shape policy choice.²³ He contends that governments investigate both behavioral signals and domestic characteristics (such as ideology and regime type) in assessing intentions. A state sees another polity as benign when its intentions are viewed as complementary to the interests of the observing state, and malign when assessments reveal intentions inimical to those interests.

Edelstein concludes that although states do invest significant time and energy in studying the intentions of others, the uncertain nature of such assessments mutes their ultimate impact on the conduct of foreign policy. As Edelstein writes, "domestic characteristics and behavioral signals are of only limited value as indicators of intentions."²⁴ Individual leaders and the attributes of specific regimes are transient. The behavior of the observed party

²² Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).

²³ David Edelstein, "Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs about Intentions and the Rise of the Great Powers," *Security Studies* 12, no. 1 (Autumn 2002).

²⁴ David Edelstein, "Managing Uncertainty," p. 10.

can also change with little warning. As a consequence, governments of necessity treat benign assessments cautiously. Edelstein notes that states at times pursue cooperative strategies nonetheless, seeking to communicate benign intentions and encourage the target state to reciprocate. But uncertainty about intentions is the norm, making states reluctant to let down their guard lest such assessments prove erroneous.

Edelstein's work opens the door to the possibility that states that perceive each other's intentions as benign should be uniquely cooperative, but he closes that door as a result of his empirical finding that efforts at assessment are regularly compromised by uncertainty. If, however, states had more confidence in their assessments, then Edelstein's insights would have quite significant implications. Under such circumstances, mutual assessments of benign intent would have transformative potential, enabling states to step away from geopolitical competition and begin the transition to stable peace.

The literature on state type provides a useful vantage point from which to further this line of inquiry into the connection between assessments of intentions and stable peace. Authors such as Charles Glaser, Andrew Kydd, Randall Schweller, and Stephen Rock distinguish in their work between status quo states and revisionist states.²⁵ According to these authors, the principal objective of status quo states is to preserve the existing international order. They seek security, not power. The principal objective of revisionist states is to overturn the existing international order and recast it to their advantage. They are greedy states, seeking to maximize their power, not their security.

If states have the ability to discern whether they are dealing with a security-seeker or a greedy state, then an international system comprised only of security-seekers should be free of geopolitical rivalry. Assuming that status quo states can send signals of benign intent to each other—and that those signals can be reliably received and interpreted—they should be able to avoid strategic competition. Both Glaser and Schweller focus on the signals sent by military policies, including unilateral initiatives, such as procuring defensive as opposed to offensive weaponry, and reciprocal measures, such as arms con-

²⁵ Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," *World Politics* 50, no. 1 (October 1997); Andrew Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," *Security Studies* 7, no. 1 (Autumn 1997); Andrew Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model," *World Politics* 49, no. 3 (April 1997); Randall L. Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); and Rock, *Appeasement in International Politics*.

trol.²⁶ Kydd enlarges the scope of this approach, contending that “we should not limit our attention to the military realm when considering how states can deliberately convey signals about their motivations.”²⁷ He argues that signals of benign intent can be communicated through a broader range of indicators such as ideology, treatment of minorities, and public statements. Rock capitalizes on these insights in his exploration of the conditions under which appeasement is an appropriate strategy for dealing with an adversary. He concludes that such conditions exist when the appeaser is confident that it is dealing with a status quo state or a state whose aggressive behavior is motivated by insecurity as opposed to greed.

The central insight of this literature is the proposition that status quo states should be able to suspend the security dilemma and coexist peacefully. In arguing that such states can recognize one another as nonthreatening and consequently pursue policies of mutual accommodation, these authors provide an important account of when and how particular groupings of countries may be able to escape anarchic competition. Inasmuch as this literature focuses on how the operation of the security dilemma can be arrested, it offers an explanation not of stable peace, but only of the absence of war. However, this literature need not halt its inquiry with the observation that status quo states can avoid rivalry. If status quo states can suspend the operation of the security dilemma, perhaps they can also make its logic work in reverse, with successive rounds of mutual accommodation leading not just to neutrality, but to friendship and durable peace. The rest of this chapter explores these leads further, building on the literature just surveyed to develop a comprehensive and compelling theory of the origins of stable peace.

DEFINITIONS

A *zone of stable peace* is a grouping of strategically proximate states among which war has become unthinkable.²⁸ The members of a zone of stable peace

²⁶ Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” *International Security* 19, no. 3 (Winter 1995/96): 68.

²⁷ Kydd, “Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing,” p. 140.

²⁸ The term “strategically proximate” connotes geopolitical interaction. The states in question must either be geographically proximate or be engaged in the same strategic theater. Paraguay and Mauritius may enjoy a state of stable peace; war between them is unthinkable. But this study is not concerned with cases in which the absence of rivalry stems from the absence of con-

succeed in demilitarizing their relationship, thereby eliminating the use of armed force as a legitimate tool of statecraft. The indicators of such demilitarization include: undefended borders and/or the redeployment of forces from contested areas; the absence of war plans against one another; a neutral or positive reaction to mutual increases in defense spending; the establishment of joint political institutions; and evidence that elites, and ultimately publics, have come to see war among the parties in question as extremely remote, if not outside the realm of the possible. The states that comprise a zone of peace renounce the use of force only against each other, not in a universal sense. They may well continue to embrace, both individually and collectively, armed conflict as a tool of statecraft with others. Indeed, zones of stable peace not infrequently entail either implicit or explicit commitments to collective security, meaning that the parties would come to one another's defense in the event of attack.

There are three main types of stable peace: *rapprochement*, *security community*, and *union*. All three belong to the same family—groupings of two or more states that succeed in escaping the logic of power balancing and significantly muting if not altogether eliminating geopolitical competition. These three types of international society represent stages along a continuum; as the parties move from *rapprochement* to *security community* to *union*, stable peace deepens and matures. Moreover, there are different gradations of stable peace. In some instances, the parties in question significantly dampen security competition, but an undercurrent of geopolitical rivalry remains. In other cases, the prospect of armed rivalry is entirely eliminated. The defining features of *rapprochement*, *security community*, and *union* are as follows.

Rapprochement entails a standing down, a move away from armed rivalry to a relationship characterized by mutual expectations of peaceful coexistence. The parties in question no longer perceive each other as posing a geopolitical threat and come to see one another as benign polities. They do not, however, seek to generate an articulated set of rules and norms to guide their behavior, nor do they come to embrace a shared or common identity. In this sense, the parties succeed in eliminating geopolitical rivalry and entering a nascent type of international society, but they then live comfortably along-

tact. Rather, it focuses on cases in which states interact with one another in one or more geopolitical theaters, but nonetheless are able to construct a durable peace.

side each other rather than seeking to expand and deepen the social character of their relations. The states in question define their interests individually, but these interests are deemed to be congruent. They maintain separate identities, but those identities are compatible rather than oppositional. To use a historical analogy, feudal lords have stopped attacking and plundering each other and have learned to coexist peacefully—even if they have not come together to improve their collective welfare through commitments to mutual assistance.

As in *rapprochement*, the members of a security community come to see each other as benign polities and thereby succeed in escaping geopolitical rivalry. But security community represents a step forward from *rapprochement* and constitutes a deeper form of stable peace in two respects. First, the members of a security community go beyond peaceful coexistence, developing rules and institutions for managing their relations, resolving disputes peacefully, and preventing power inequalities from threatening group cohesion. Nonetheless, the members of a security community retain significant elements of sovereignty and each is free to pursue its own foreign policy with respect to outside states. Second, the members of a security community enjoy a sense of *we-ness* or a shared identity. Regulative and constitutive norms combine to give security communities a distinctive social character and help extend predictability and expectations of programmatic cooperation. With the blurring of self/other distinctions, interests come to be defined conjointly rather than individually. To return to the analogy, the feudal lords have forged a league of fiefdoms, promoting their collective welfare and defining their interests communally.

A union is the most highly evolved form of stable peace. The states in question not only see one another as benign, but they merge into a new polity, eliminating their individual sovereignties and minimizing the geopolitical significance of their territorial borders. In so doing, they participate in and consider as legitimate a supra-state realm of political life. In a security community, relations among member states are collectively managed, but each member governs its own domestic affairs and conducts its own relations with non-members. In a union, member states usually cede to a central authority significant control over domestic affairs and the conduct of foreign and defense policy. Interests become defined in unitary rather than conjoint terms. A shared identity is gradually transformed into a common identity. The feu-

Type of Stable Peace	Benign Character	Agreement on Order	Interests	Identity	Legitimation
Rapprochement	Yes	No	Congruent	Compatible	No
Security Community	Yes	Yes	Conjoined	Shared	No
Union	Yes	Yes	Unitary	Common	Yes

FIGURE 2.2 Types of Stable Peace and Defining Characteristics

dal lords have merged their separate fiefdoms into a unitary state and direct their loyalty to a central government.

Rapprochement, security community, and union thus differ as to the formality and scope of the key bargains that lock in stable peace. Rapprochement rests on tacit understandings to preserve peace; practice, not principle, guides behavior. The participants in a security community go one step further, reaching agreement upon the group’s ordering rules and often making them explicit in declarations and charters; practice and principle combine to guide behavior. A union generally entails codified agreement not just about ordering rules, but also about rules for making rules. The agreed-upon order is normally formalized through a constitution that specifies legally binding commitments; principle guides practice and behavior. These key attributes of the three types of stable peace are summarized in figure 2.2.

QUALIFICATIONS

Several qualifications help delimit and narrow the phenomenon under study. As mentioned previously, instances of militarized and “cold” peace, even if long-lasting, do not qualify as cases of stable peace. From the late 1940s until the early 1990s, a “long peace” may have characterized relations between the United States and Soviet Union, but both parties had war plans at the ready; the absence of conflict was the product primarily of deterrence. Brazil and Argentina last went to war in the 1820s, but not until the 1980s did mutual suspicion and hostility between them give way to reconciliation and programmatic cooperation. Stable peace is thus reserved for a class of events in which

the absence of war is the product of comity rather than either competition or indifference.

Short-lived and threat-specific alliances also lie outside the scope of this study. States form such alliances to amass countervailing power against a common external threat. It may well be that the states joining forces for the purposes of collective defense do not contemplate war with each other. But these conditions are the temporary product of geopolitical circumstance, not of the emergence of a warm and durable peace. It is the case that some alliances eventually evolve into zones of peace—as did the Quadruple Alliance after 1815 and the Atlantic Alliance over the course of the Cold War. But such cases constitute a unique subset, with most alliances dissolving well before they develop into a zone of stable peace.

Also excluded are cases in which stable peace emerges as the direct product of war and occupation. Lasting reconciliation in the immediate aftermath of war certainly does qualify as a legitimate pathway to stable peace. But the defeat and surrender of one of the parties, the ensuing occupation of territory and purge of the vanquished regime, and the construction of a new regime by the victor render this form of stable peace somewhat “artificial.” Examining such cases would shed light on how occupation and reconstruction can promote lasting political change, but not on how interstate comity can be built through measures other than war. For these reasons, America’s post-World War II reconciliation with Germany and Japan, Franco-German rapprochement, and other similar cases are not included in this study.²⁹

In similar fashion, zones of stable peace that emerge as the result of armed coercion are also outside the scope of this study. This qualification is particularly important in examining cases of union, many of which are forged through acts of war. For example, the union of England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland currently constitutes a zone of peace, with the units conjoined consensually through representative institutions (the obvious caveats about Northern Ireland notwithstanding). But the process of unification was long and bloody as England forcibly asserted its dominion over its neighbors. In contrast, the cases of union examined in this book involve peaceful change, historical episodes in which separate states willfully pool their sover-

²⁹ In chapter 5, I examine the onset of European integration, of necessity examining Franco-German rapprochement after World War II. However, I do so to study the pathway through which security community took shape in Western Europe, not to examine only reconciliation between France and Germany.

eignties and merge into a unitary polity. This distinction arises from the need to focus on instances of geopolitical transformation that occur consensually rather than as the result of force and coercion.³⁰

A final qualification concerns the standards for determining when a zone of stable peace has emerged. Ideally, the standards should be high and consistent—unequivocal evidence that the states in question have no war plans against each other, have demilitarized their borders and interactions, and have come to see armed conflict as outside the realm of the possible. Many of the cases examined below meet these standards, but some fall short.³¹ For example, the five members of the Concert of Europe did fashion a rules-based order and agreed to resolve any disputes among themselves through negotiation. But a hint of geopolitical rivalry remained, and war among the members of the Concert, though a remote prospect, was not entirely unthinkable. A similar assessment applies to a contemporary case of security community—ASEAN.

Such cases are nonetheless included in this study for two principal reasons. First, groupings that succeed only in muting rather than completely eliminating geopolitical competition are still part of the family of political formations defined by the notion of stable peace. Inasmuch as their members let down their guard, forego opportunities for individual gain, and agree to resolve disputes peacefully, they play by the rules of international society and defy the logic of anarchic competition. Furthermore, a certain degree of variation in outcomes affords analytic leverage, with exploration of nascent or more contingent zones of peace providing insight not only into how states succeed in escaping rivalry but also why the process of reconciliation may find a stable resting point short of the complete elimination of security competition.

Second, such groupings constitute a significant class of events in their own right. A grouping of states that agree to resolve disputes peacefully and fashion practices and conventions for doing so is a rare and important phenome-

³⁰ I treat Italian and German unification as successful and noncoercive instances of union even though violence occurred among the units that eventually formed the new states. In both cases, such violence occurred primarily amid wars against parties not included in the resulting union—Austria and France in the case of Italy, and Denmark, Austria, and France in the case of Germany. Moreover, the ultimate acts of union generally occurred through consensual negotiations and—in the Italian case—plebiscites rather than coercive annexation.

³¹ Security communities often retain an undercurrent of geopolitical rivalry. In the introduction to chapter 5, I examine this anomaly, exploring why security communities, although they in principle represent a more evolved form of stable peace than rapprochement, may in some circumstances be more shallow and fragile than rapprochement.

non. Furthermore, in light of the dim prospects for abolishing geopolitical competition globally, thinking through how to encourage the proliferation of regionally based security communities—even ones that fall short of entirely eliminating rivalry—may offer one of the most realistic avenues for extending stable peace as widely as possible.

HOW STABLE PEACE BREAKS OUT

Stable peace emerges through a sequential process that cuts across longstanding theoretical divides. Realism adequately explains the outset. Strategic necessity induces a state faced with an unmanageable array of threats to seek to befriend an existing adversary; resource constraints make accommodation and cooptation preferable to balancing and confrontation. The process next moves into the realm of liberalism. Domestic attributes—regime type, coalitional alignments, and substate interest groups—come into play, with societal integration facilitating and deepening the process of reconciliation. A constructivist perspective best explains the final stage of the process. Changes in political discourse and identity erode the self/other distinctions that are at the foundation of geopolitical competition.

This sequential process consists of four distinct phases, differentiated by the behavioral activity driving transformation in interstate relations, the political attributes being evaluated by the partner states, and the resulting attitude or affect of the parties toward each other. Phase one consists of *unilateral accommodation*. One party makes an initial concession to the other as an opening gesture of good will. It is then up to the target state to reciprocate with its own act of accommodation. During these opening concessions, the parties seek to discern the *intent* behind such moves and begin to entertain *hope* that they are dealing with a potential partner rather than an implacable adversary. Phase two entails *reciprocal restraint*. Expectations of reciprocity promote successive rounds of mutual accommodation. The parties evaluate one another's broader *motivation*, not just their narrow intent with respect to specific concessions. Hope gives way to mutual *confidence* that rivalry can be averted and that repeated acts of mutual accommodation can lead to peace and, possibly, programmatic cooperation. Phase three consists of *societal integration*. As the polities in question interact with increasing frequency and intensity, they come to attribute benign qualities to one another's *political*

Phase	Activity	Attribute Assessed	Resulting Affect
I	Unilateral Accommodation	Intent	Hope
II	Reciprocal Restraint	Motivation	Confidence
III	Societal Integration	Character	Trust
IV	Narrative Generation	Identity	Solidarity

FIGURE 2.3 Stable Peace: Four Phases of Onset

character. Confidence builds, giving way to a sense of mutual *trust*. The final phase consists of the *generation of new political narratives*. Using the discourse of community as a vehicle, the politics in question embrace a compatible, shared, or common *identity* and expectations of peaceful relations come to have a taken-for-granted quality, producing a sense of social *solidarity*. Figure 2.3 summarizes the four-phase process that leads to stable peace.

In its ideal form, the evolution of stable peace from rapprochement to security community to union is itself a sequential process. After states have passed through the four phases of onset, they attain rapprochement—peaceful coexistence. As their relationship matures, peaceful coexistence evolves into a rules-based security community. The process culminates in the pooling of sovereignty and the act of union. In this sense, rapprochement, security community, and union represent three stages along a continuum. Rapprochement lays the groundwork, with a core grouping of states moving away from adversarial competition and embracing compatible identities. As the parties institutionalize cooperation and expand societal linkages, security community forms around this kernel, with its members agreeing on rules to govern their relations and embracing a shared identity. Over time, the deepening of societal integration and the generation of a narrative of common identity legitimate supra-state institutions of governance and pave the way for union.

In reality, this sequential model represents only an ideal type. Each instance of the onset of stable peace follows a historically contingent path. Some security communities form after a brief and fleeting period of rapprochement, while others come together only after years of reconciliation. Some unions take decades to mature, while others form more suddenly. The cases also vary




FIGURE 2.4 The Sequential Pathway to Stable Peace

widely in that some instances of stable peace proceed further along the continuum than others. Some states attain rapprochement but go no further, others stop at security community, while still others proceed all the way to formal union (see figure 2.4). The cases do shed some light on when and why different groupings of states reach different endpoints along this continuum—an issue taken up at the end of this chapter. First, the four-phase process of onset and the conditions leading to stable peace are examined in detail.

Phase One: Unilateral Accommodation

The road to stable peace begins amid peril. A state facing an array of threats against which it has insufficient resources attempts to improve its strategic environment by seeking to befriend one of its adversaries. It does so by send-

ing a signal of benign intent through the offer of an unambiguous concession on a matter of mutual interest. Through this opening gambit, the initiating state deliberately makes itself vulnerable to exploitation. Such demonstrable vulnerability is important for two reasons. First, by undertaking an unusual and costly action—such as backing down on a border dispute or unilaterally withdrawing forces from a contested area—the initiator increases the chances that its actions will be noticed and correctly interpreted by the target state. Second, by deliberately seeking to make itself vulnerable, the initiating state is taking a calculated risk that it will not be taken advantage of by the target state, revealing not only that it does not have predatory intent, but also that it believes (or is at least willing to hold out hope) that the target state does not have predatory intent. By indicating both that its own intentions are not predatory and that it believes that the intentions of the target state may also be other than predatory, the initiator has sent a clear signal of its desire to step away from geopolitical competition.

The target state then decides its first move. If it exploits the initiator's concession or fails to respond in kind, the opening gambit falls short of its objective and geopolitical rivalry continues. If the target state accurately interprets the act of accommodation as a potential peace offering and reciprocates, then the stage has been set for additional rounds of mutual concession. The parties have taken the first critical step toward stable peace.

Edelstein and other scholars are skeptical that such acts of accommodation have the potential to lead to reconciliation, claiming that mutual uncertainty as to intent ultimately remains an insurmountable obstacle to moving from isolated concessions to regularized reciprocity. Both parties would fear they are being tricked, expect exploitation, and thus be unprepared to let down their guard. But as Glaser, Kydd, and Schweller have observed, states can and do go to considerable lengths to reveal the intentions behind their actions. Glaser writes that “a state seeking security should be concerned about whether its adversary understands that its motivations are benign.”³² A state can enhance its ability to demonstrate benign intent by pursuing policy initiatives that are both costly and unambiguous—those that it would be very unlikely to pursue unless it is sincerely interested in befriending its adversary. The clarity of such signaling is further enhanced if the policy measures taken are difficult to reverse, ameliorating the target state's fear that the measure

³² Glaser, “Realists as Optimists,” p. 67.

could be a ruse. Demilitarizing contested areas, destroying fortifications, and making territorial concessions are examples. Such moves facilitate the target state's ability to read intent into behavior. As Kydd notes, a "security seeker . . . needs to go beyond tokens, and make concessions weighty enough so that a state contemplating attack or coercion would be unwilling to make them. Thus the concessions are inherently risky and would not carry conviction if they were not."³³ It is when both initiator and target state make such costly concessions—and as a result attribute benign intent to each other's actions—that the mutual suspicion that sustains rivalry gives way to guarded hope in reconciliation, thereby initiating the sequential process that has the potential to lead to stable peace.

The nature and import of this opening interaction are well captured in a scene from the film, *The Hunt for Red October*.³⁴ The film is about a Soviet submarine that is attempting to defect to the United States. It is being silently tracked by an American submarine, whose commander has been ordered to destroy the vessel; officials in Washington believe the renegade Soviet submarine to be intent on launching nuclear missiles against the United States. Meanwhile, an American intelligence officer aboard the U.S. submarine, who is aware of the Soviet commander's true intentions, is trying to convince the U.S. commander that the Soviet vessel is in fact attempting to defect.

Faced with the difficult task of probing the intentions of the Soviet boat without imperiling his own vessel, the U.S. commander decides to reverse his submarine's propeller, thereby disrupting the flow of water and causing noise audible to the adversary. In so doing, he makes his presence and position known to the Soviet commander—a cardinal sin of submarine warfare—running the risk of being fired upon. As the U.S. commander colloquially describes his vessel's sudden vulnerability, "We just unzipped our fly." It is precisely because the U.S. ship deliberately and unnecessarily makes itself vulnerable to attack that the Soviet commander has good reason to believe that the American submarine has benign intent. Why else would it have deliberately exposed its position? The Soviet submarine reciprocates by consciously avoiding the usual course of action in such circumstances—full preparation to fire upon the U.S. vessel—revealing that it too does not have hostile intent. The U.S. commander cannot but notice this extraordinary and

³³ Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing," pp. 144–145.

³⁴ The film is based on Tom Clancy's novel, *The Hunt for Red October* (New York: Berkeley, 1984).

costly gesture, noting, “He’s a very cool customer.” Thereafter, the two commanders communicate directly—first through sonar “pings,” next via periscope and Morse code, finally through a face-to-face meeting aboard the Soviet vessel—successfully arranging for the peaceful defection of the Soviet submarine to the United States. Enemies became friends.

It was the opening move of the U.S. commander that averted conflict and cleared the way for the two adversaries to back away from hostile engagement. By reversing its propeller, the U.S. boat was attempting to send a clear signal of its benign intent. The Soviet commander could not be certain of the objective behind this act. But the move was sufficiently unusual, costly, unambiguous, and irreversible that it made little sense except as a deliberate signal of benign intent. After the Soviet commander reciprocated the gesture of good will, diminishing uncertainty enabled both commanders to stand down their weapons systems, discuss directly the arrangements for defection, and secure the equivalent of stable peace. The onset of stable peace among nations begins with similar moves. Costly and unambiguous acts of accommodation send signals of benign intent, opening the door to a standing down of rivalry and the advance of reconciliation.

Although this section of the analysis is focused on how, not when, initial accommodation occurs, discussion of the conditions under which the opening gambit takes place helps clarify the logic at work. According to much of the existing literature, a strategy of accommodating the demands of an adversary is usually associated with the notion of bandwagoning; a weaker state capitulates to its stronger adversary because it does not have the resources to do otherwise. If it did have those resources, it would balance instead of bandwagon, affording it greater security and autonomy.³⁵

The historical cases examined in the following chapters challenge this conventional account, revealing that it is usually the stronger of the parties that undertakes the opening gambit and makes the initial concession to its adversary. The initiator faces a sufficiently pressing threat environment to induce it to attempt to befriend one of its foes. But its relative strength also puts it in a better position to offer concessions since it is more confident than the weaker party that it will not suffer unacceptable costs should the target state fail to reciprocate. To return to *The Hunt for Red October*, the U.S. commander was willing to take the risk of making his presence known to his adversary in part

³⁵ See, for example, Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*.

because he was in firing range of the Soviet submarine and was ready to take hostile action if its commander failed to reciprocate his act of accommodation. A similar logic applies to relations between states. A concession coming from a stronger power is more likely to be seen by the target state as an optional act intended to reassure than a concession coming from a weaker state—which is likely to be seen by the stronger party as an act of self-interested necessity. Had the tracked and vulnerable Soviet submarine been the one to make the opening gambit, the U.S. commander may well have interpreted the concession as an act of submission or desperation rather than a signal of benign intent.

It is also the case that an initial assessment of the target state's motivations plays a role in determining if and when a country considering unilateral accommodation actually follows through and offers a major concession. The state contemplating an act of accommodation must have at least some indication that it is not dealing with a greedy state, one bent on predatory conquest. Otherwise, it would accurately perceive a concessionary strategy to be an invitation to aggression and consequently adopt a threatening or deterrent strategy rather than make an exploratory probe. In *The Hunt for Red October*, the U.S. commander had good reason to believe that the Soviet submarine was indeed attempting to defect; the U.S. intelligence officer making the case for defection had succeeded in establishing his credibility with the captain. Had the U.S. commander been convinced that the Soviet commander had hostile intent, he would not have run the risk of revealing his location to his adversary. In similar fashion, a state contemplating efforts to befriend an adversary will undertake a costly act of accommodation only if it has reason to believe that the target may have other than hostile intent. How states locked in geopolitical competition make such initial determinations of the nature of their adversary is discussed later in this chapter.

Phase Two: Reciprocal Restraint

During the second phase of the onset of stable peace, the trading of individual acts of accommodation gives way to the practice of reciprocal restraint. Concessions are no longer bolts from the blue—risky gambits aimed at sending benign signals and probing the other's intentions. Rather, both parties readily practice accommodation and expect reciprocity; cautious testing gives way to a purposeful effort to dampen rivalry and advance reconciliation.

In his book on stable peace, Kenneth Boulding recognizes the importance of iterative acts of mutual accommodation, labeling such behavior as Graduated and Reciprocated Initiative in Tension-Reduction (GRIT). Boulding writes, “The GRIT process begins by some rather specific, perhaps even dramatic, statement or act directed at a potential enemy (like Sadat’s 1977 visit to Israel), intended to be reassuring. . . . If the potential enemy responds, then a third act by the first party, a fourth by the second party, and so on” provides the foundation for a “peace dynamic.”³⁶

As unilateral accommodation gives way to reciprocal restraint, the practice of reciprocity becomes normalized. Amid the onset of rapprochement, restraint takes the form of *self-binding*: the parties move beyond the exchange of individual acts of accommodation by regularizing the reciprocal withholding of power through measures such as demilitarization, territorial concession, and the removal of barriers to commerce. The exercise of strategic restraint becomes the rule, not the exception. Amid the onset of security community and union, reciprocal restraint also entails *co-binding*: the parties bind themselves to one another through informal pacts or codified agreements that institutionalize restraint and specify the terms of a rules-based order. Co-binding and the institutionalization of restraint involve the establishment of power-checking devices. These power-checking mechanisms take many different forms, including: rules for resolving disputes and reaching decisions through consensus; provisions to contain or set aside disagreements in order to prevent disputes from leading to conflict; and instruments for redistributing and de-concentrating political influence, military strength, and wealth in order to reduce the political consequences of power asymmetries.³⁷

This account of how reciprocal restraint lays a foundation for reconciliation is, at least at first glance, entirely consistent with a liberal approach to the evolution of cooperation as articulated by scholars such as Robert Keohane, Robert Axelrod, and Kenneth Oye.³⁸ Entrenched competition gives way

³⁶ Boulding, *Stable Peace*, pp. 112–113.

³⁷ On the concepts of binding and co-binding, see Daniel Deudney, *Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Ikenberry, *After Victory*; and Charles A. Kupchan, “After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity,” *International Security* 23, no. 2 (Fall 1998): 42–79. For further discussion, see the introduction to chapter 5.

³⁸ Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Kenneth Oye, *Cooperation under Anarchy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).

to regularized cooperation as international regimes increase transparency, create enforcement mechanisms to induce compliance, and give states incentives to develop a reputation for reciprocity. The parties remain self-regarding and utilitarian, but their interests are better furthered by cooperation than competition. As Keohane writes, institutionalized cooperation “is not the result of altruism but of the fact that joining a regime changes calculations of long-run self-interest.”³⁹

The second phase of the onset of stable peace does, however, go beyond a liberal account of international cooperation in important and consequential respects. The concessions exchanged by the parties engaging in reconciliation are unique in nature and scope. They involve instances of strategic self-restraint in which states demonstrate their willingness to risk high-value interests such as physical security and territorial integrity. Strategic restraint is a rare commodity in international politics—precisely why it stands out and serves as an exceptional signal of benign intent.⁴⁰ Self-restraint is especially rare when practiced by a preponderant state, which, as mentioned above, is often the party to initiate the opening gambit. The practice of strategic restraint need not overstep the bounds of a liberal perspective, as John Ikenberry has demonstrated by articulating a rationalist account of the benefits of such behavior. When preponderant states withhold their power and influence, they willingly give up the full advantages of primacy and forego immediate opportunities to capitalize on material advantage. They instead invest in stability over the long term by inducing smaller states to enter into a bargain based on the practice of mutual accommodation. Weaker states have a strong incentive to take up this bargain inasmuch as they have on offer a rare chance to minimize the disadvantages associated with material inferiority.⁴¹

Although Ikenberry offers a compelling account of the incentives inducing strong and weak states alike to engage in mutual accommodation, he fails to capture fully the transformative effects of reciprocal restraint on interstate relations. Amid reciprocal restraint, states are no longer just probing each

³⁹ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, p. 116.

⁴⁰ A standard realist critique of a liberal account of institutionalized cooperation is that most instances of cooperation entail economic transactions, where the stakes are lower than in the security realm. See John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” *International Security* 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/1995). The infrequency of unambiguous acts of restraint on the security front is one of the main reasons they serve as credible and visible signals of benign intent.

⁴¹ Ikenberry, *After Victory*.

other's intent through isolated acts of accommodation. Rather, they begin to form assessments of each other's broader motivations, weaving iterated acts of accommodation into a stable evaluation of the other's long-term objectives. Perceptions of benign intent cumulate and intensify, gradually becoming perceptions of benign motivation. The parties come to see one another as having broadly congruent interests in the international arena, not just compatible intent with respect to the issues on which they have made concessions.

From this perspective, the practice of reciprocal restraint ultimately changes how the states engaging in reconciliation perceive the geopolitical implications of power asymmetries. When states exercise strategic restraint and explicitly reveal the benign motivations for doing so, they are able to endow their power with a magnetic ability to attract and reassure other countries instead of a propensity to threaten them and trigger balancing. Material power loses its coercive dimension, instead becoming an ingredient critical to bringing about cooperation and consensual outcomes.

This critical transformation in the structural effects of material power can be conceptualized from three different angles. From a functionalist perspective, power wedded to benign motivation emits centripetal rather than centrifugal force, "convening" or "grouping" states instead of prompting them to run for cover. A concentration of power thus exerts an anchoring or centering pull on the states around it, drawing them toward one another. In Deutsch's words, preponderant states come "to form the cores of strength around which in most cases the integrative process developed."⁴² Economic power offers the prospect of mutual gain, military power the prospect of mutual security. The realist logic of power balancing under uncertainty thus ceases to operate when the states in question are confident in their assessment of the other's benign motivations.

From a constructivist perspective, practice alters social reality. As states regularize strategic restraint, they embrace, in the words of Adler and Barnett, "shared meanings and understandings" or "cognitive structures."⁴³ The normalization of cooperative practices informs a social reality that both parties deem to be noncompetitive, in turn enabling them to further let down

⁴² Deutsch, *Political Community*, p. 38.

⁴³ Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*, p. 40. See also Alastair Iain Johnston, *Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

their guard. In this sense, a self-fulfilling prophecy is at work. If both parties come to conceive of their relationship as noncompetitive and behave accordingly, then the relationship becomes effectively noncompetitive. As the practice of reciprocal restraint becomes the norm, social reality is, as it were, pacified.⁴⁴ This interpretation follows directly from Alexander Wendt's now classic formulation: "Anarchy is what states make of it."⁴⁵

From a psychological perspective, affect and emotion play an important role in transforming how partner states respond to one another's material power.⁴⁶ Through reciprocal restraint, the parties grow comfortable with each other's power as they come to see accommodating behavior as the product of benign motivation rather than just situational intent. The respective strength of each state and their combined ability to secure desired outcomes becomes a source of mutual reassurance. They let down their guard not because of a probabilistic calculation suggesting that exploitation is unlikely, but because a favorable emotive bias prevails as mutual perceptions of benign motivation solidify. Just as acts of generosity engender empathy among individuals, acts of strategic restraint engender affinity among states.

As the case studies will demonstrate, these three analytic perspectives are by no means incompatible; all three processes are often at work as stable peace advances. Indeed, it is these mechanisms and the insights they offer about the transformative effects of reciprocal restraint that explain how states succeed in going beyond neutrality to warm peace. Glaser and Kydd accept that the mutual perception of benign intent can arrest the operation of the security dilemma. Unintended spirals do not occur when both parties have concluded that the other has benign intentions. But their story stops there.

In contrast, the analysis presented here posits that the practice of reciprocal restraint succeeds not only in arresting the security dilemma, but also in enabling it to work in reverse. Each state takes actions to increase the other's security, in the first instance winding down rivalry and attaining neutrality,

⁴⁴ For a thorough discussion of the relationship between the practice of self-restraint and the formation of security community, see Emanuel Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post Cold War Transformation," *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 2 (2008).

⁴⁵ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992). See also Jeffrey Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe," *International Organization* 59, no. 4 (October 2005).

⁴⁶ See John Mercer, "Emotion Adds Life," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, 18–21 February, 1999, Washington, DC.

but thereafter actively promoting amity and taking incremental steps toward warm peace. Put differently, the political momentum behind reconciliation gradually shifts from the negative to the positive. At its outset, the exercise of reciprocal restraint, the regularization of accommodation, and the institutionalization of power-checking devices are about dampening rivalry and avoiding competition. As these practices and institutions mature, they become about building up amity and producing friendship. As reassurance and comfort deepen, the relationship starts to become demilitarized or, to use Ole Waever's terminology, "desecuritized."⁴⁷ In the first phase of the onset of stable peace, each state is hopeful that the other has benign intent. In this second phase, each state becomes confident that the other has benign motivations.

Phase Three: Societal Integration

The third phase of the onset of stable peace is about societal integration. Reciprocal restraint, the gradual winding down of geopolitical competition, and the mutual attribution of benign motivation clear the way for the intensification of direct contact between the reconciling societies. In contrast to the first two phases, when governing elites are the primary agents driving forward the process of reconciliation, the third phase entails the involvement of bureaucracies, private firms, and mobilized citizens. The mechanisms at work track closely Deutsch's transactional approach and his focus on the broadening and deepening of social communication. Officials regularly come into direct contact, drawn together by improving political ties and the opportunities to coordinate policy. Interest groups in favor of reconciliation form within the bureaucracy and among political parties. Private firms take advantage of the opportunity to increase trade and investment. Societal integration also takes place among ordinary citizens through tourism, business ties, new communication links, and cultural and academic exchanges—especially since the advent of modern transportation and electronic communication systems.

Societal integration thus occurs at multiple levels. Regular face-to-face meetings between government officials foster ideational convergence on substantive policy issues. During the first and second phases of reconciliation,

⁴⁷ See Ole Waever, "Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community," in Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*, pp. 69–118.

elite contact is sporadic and usually prompted by negotiations over specific issues. During this third phase, elite contact becomes routine.⁴⁸ At this point, the dialogue has fully advanced beyond modalities for avoiding rivalry, now focusing primarily on measures that will deepen cooperation and amity. The concept of an “epistemic community”—a grouping of policy makers who come to share common ideational and normative orientations—neatly captures one of the key consequences of intensifying elite contact.⁴⁹

Governmental interest groups also play a prominent role in promoting societal integration—a development key to managing the domestic politics of accommodation. The initial steps toward stable peace are often opposed by hardliners and nationalists who portray concessions as a dangerous gesture of weakness likely to invite aggression. Even elites who support accommodation may remain silent, fearful of being labeled by hardliners as unpatriotic appeasers. Once the opening gambit has worked and the practice of reciprocal restraint has been sustained, however, factions favoring such strategies form and openly acknowledge their preferences, providing political cover for accommodation and building momentum behind reconciliation. There are usually three main sources of such support. First, policy makers and bureaucrats step forward, making clear that they back the new direction of policy. Second, the military throws its support behind reconciliation, recognizing that it offers the prospect of a major reduction in commitments. Finally, internationalist political parties that would reap benefits from reconciliation back accommodation, often working in unison with like-minded parties in the partner state. The strengthening of internationalist coalitions in one state tends to benefit the political fortunes of like-minded coalitions in the other.⁵⁰

Private-sector firms benefiting from increasing flows of goods and services help strengthen societal linkages. Powerful constituencies on both sides come to have a vested interest in stable peace, lobbying within their countries for policies of reciprocal restraint and economic integration. Importantly, and

⁴⁸ Experimental research has made clear that face-to-face communication substantially increases trust and the likelihood of cooperative outcomes. See Elinor Ostrom, “A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action,” *American Political Science Review* 92, no. 1 (March 1998).

⁴⁹ See Peter Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” *International Organization* 46, no. 1 (Winter 1992).

⁵⁰ See John Owen, “Pieces of Stable Peace: A Pessimistic Constructivism,” unpublished paper, University of Virginia; and Etel Solingen, *Regional Orders at Century’s Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).

contra Deutsch, the positive political impact of economic integration usually follows from rather than precedes the dampening of strategic rivalry. Economic interdependence may intensify even while strategic competition ensues. But it plays a prominent role in the onset of stable peace only when it takes place within the context of strategic restraint and political reconciliation.

Societal integration also takes place among publics, with ordinary citizens in partner states exposed to more information about the other, in some cases through direct contact. Public engagement is frequently the product of explicit efforts to build political support for reconciliation through education campaigns, the media, and exchange programs sponsored by governments as well as the private sector. Societal integration at the popular level also follows from the greater opportunities for travel afforded by the expansion of land, sea, and air links. In line with the processes described in Deutsch's *Political Community*, increases in social communication—official delegations, cultural exchanges, trade, tourism, and migration—gradually give rise to “a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of ‘we feeling,’ trust, and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests.”⁵¹

As these forms of societal integration concurrently proceed, they advance reconciliation and the onset of stable peace on four key dimensions. First, interstate linkages become more fully institutionalized, starting at the official level, but often extending to the private sector and to citizen exchange programs. The benefits offered by institutionalization have been well articulated by liberals—increased transparency, lower transaction costs, and extended expectations of reciprocity. At least as important are the sociological effects of institutionalization, with a network of linkages developing between the societies in question. As Deutsch's work illuminated, these linkages over time foster a sense of community and we-ness. Émile Durkheim's notion of “organic solidarity” is useful here. As integration proceeds across different sectors of society, “the more individuals there are who are sufficiently in contact with one another to be able mutually to act and react upon one another.”⁵²

Second, at this stage in the process, elites explicitly seek to shape public attitudes. The first two phases of reconciliation—unilateral accommodation and reciprocal restraint—are primarily elite enterprises. Indeed, governing officials deliberately avoid public engagement in order to obtain the political

⁵¹ Deutsch, *Political Community*, p. 36.

⁵² Émile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* (New York: Free Press, 1984), p. 201.

room for maneuver necessary to orchestrate the initial acts of accommodation. In contrast, during the stage of societal integration, elites attempt to build broader domestic support for their conciliatory policies by explaining their benefits to the public. They also begin to reframe political discourse, starting to portray the partner state as an ally or friend rather than an enemy. These efforts at public outreach help disarm nationalist opposition to accommodation, and make it less likely that a popular backlash against reconciliation will interrupt if not scuttle the process. They also make reconciliation less dependent upon a specific set of leaders, giving the process deeper political and social roots. A change of government is then less likely to end or reverse efforts to promote stable peace.

Third, as societal integration advances, governments begin to form assessments not just of the partner state's motivations, but also of its political character. The parties have increasing knowledge of each other's society and governing institutions, enabling them to attribute to the other a benign political character. Each side begins to interpret its partner's behavior as dispositional—a product of its values and political system—rather than situational—a product of specific circumstance.⁵³ The mutual attribution of benign character represents a critical turning point. States are no longer basing their policies of accommodation on the discrete intentions or motivations of the other, feeling their way forward with each round of concessions. Rather, they are prepared to let down their guard as a matter of course; the prospect of armed conflict is becoming remote, if not unthinkable. Stable peace begins to enjoy a taken-for-granted quality.

The fourth dimension along which societal interaction promotes stable peace follows directly. The main affect that polities exhibit toward each other advances from confidence to trust. Amid reciprocal restraint, assessment of benign motivation enables states to be confident that partner states will not exploit their concessions. Amid societal integration, assessment of benign character leads each state to trust that its partner states will not defect from cooperative practices. Trust minimizes the effects of uncertainty, enabling each side to keep its guard down even in the face of incomplete information.

⁵³ Jonathan Mercer argues that states initially view desirable behavior by adversaries to be the result of situational pressures, not disposition. It follows that only after a significant period of mutual accommodation will they come to see concessions as the product of disposition rather than situation. See Mercer, *Reputation and International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).

In this respect—and directly countering the realist claim that uncertainty constitutes an inescapable obstacle to cooperation—states become willing to tolerate mutual vulnerability despite irreducible uncertainty about the other's motivations. In the words of Barbara Misztal, “What makes trust so puzzling is that to trust involves more than believing; in fact, to trust is to believe despite uncertainty.”⁵⁴ Magnus Ericson agrees that trust enables states “to divine the true, non-malevolent, intentions behind each other's actions, *prior* to any particular reckoning of motives or rational cost/benefit calculation.”⁵⁵

Inasmuch as trust is a key ingredient of social capital, its presence extends the social character of the evolving relationship between the parties in question. Trust also heightens the emotive impact of societal interaction, deepening a mutual sense of affinity. By this stage in the transition from enemy to friend, the processes at work have become less rationalist and more sociological in character, marking the onset of international society.

Phase Four: Narrative Generation and Identity Change

The fourth and final phase of the onset of stable peace is about identity change. Through the generation of new narratives, the states engaged in reconciliation recast the identities they hold of each other.⁵⁶ In the case of rapprochement, identities remain separate, yet become compatible. In the case of security community, identities overlap and the states in question come to enjoy a shared identity or *we-ness*. In the case of union, partner states embrace a common identity. These changes in identity ultimately blur the self/other distinctions that animate geopolitical rivalry. Trust advances to solidarity, deepening the taken-for-granted quality of stable peace.

The generation of new narratives begins at the elite level, with officials altering the language they use to refer to the partner state. Adversarial or neutral references give way to language that connotes images of partnership and

⁵⁴ Barbara Misztal, *Trust in Modern Societies: The Search for the Bases of Social Order* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p. 18. See also Rikard Bengtsson, “The Cognitive Dimension of Stable Peace,” in Kacowicz et al., *Stable Peace Among Nations*.

⁵⁵ Magnus Ericson, “The Liberal Peace Meets History: The Scandinavian Experience,” unpublished paper, Lund University, p. 3. See also Rikard Bengtsson, “The Cognitive Dimension of Stable Peace,” in Kacowicz et al., *Stable Peace Among Nations*, pp. 94–96.

⁵⁶ For discussion of the mechanisms through which collective identities form, see Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 2 (June 1994): 384–396.

friendship. The precise content of the narrative that informs compatible, shared, and common identities varies among the cases, but the discourse usually contains a standard set of concepts and markers. The parties in question regularly allude to bonds of kinship and family. The change in discourse often involves a new accounting of the past—one that downplays conflict and highlights historic ties and common values. In the Anglo-American case, for example, narratives focusing on adversarial competition gradually gave way to preoccupation with ancestral and racial bonds, common Anglo-Saxon values, and the proposition that war between the United States and Great Britain would constitute “fratricide.” In security communities and unions, communal symbols such as flags and anthems often accompany these changes in discourse. The new language and symbols are also propagated by non-state agents, including the press, private firms that favor economic integration, and teachers, intellectuals, and writers who shape public opinion through education, literature, film, and theater.

If changes in practice inform the new understandings of social reality that open the door to stable peace, then changes in discourse inform the new identities that lock in stable peace. The post-modernist tradition, with its emphasis on “speech acts,” provides a useful theoretical platform.⁵⁷ The work of Janice Bially Mattern is especially instructive, as her subject matter is the preservation of stable peace between the United States and Great Britain. In examining the durability of the Anglo-American security community amid the Suez Crisis, Mattern argues that both the United States and Great Britain relied on “representational force, a form of power exercised through language, to stabilize their collective identity.”⁵⁸ She contends that U.S. and British elites alike used language to “fasten” or “cement” a shared conception of Anglo-American identity. This shared identity, which was the culmination of

⁵⁷ See J. L. Austin, J. O. Urmson, and Marina Sbisa, *How To Do Things With Words* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976); Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976); and John Searle, *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969). For applications in the international relations literature, see Thomas Risse, “‘Let’s Argue!’ Communicative Action in World Politics,” *International Organization* 54, no. 1 (Winter 2000); Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union,” *International Organization* 55, no. 1 (2001); Ronald Krebs and Patrick Jackson, “Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric,” *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 1 (2007); and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006).

⁵⁸ Janice Bially Mattern, “The Power Politics of Identity,” *European Journal of International Relations* 7, no. 3 (2001), p. 349.

the process of reconciliation that began in the nineteenth century, enabled a sense of community to endure even when short-term interests diverged—as they did during the Suez Crisis. “The ‘reality’ of we-ness,” Mattern writes, “depends upon the persistence of a narrative . . . depicting an appropriately deep and trusting friendship among actors.”⁵⁹

The generation and consolidation of a narrative of communal identity bring the onset of stable peace to completion. It is through this four-phase sequence of unilateral accommodation, reciprocal restraint, societal integration, and narrative generation that states find their way to stable peace. The process starts in the realist world of suspicion and competition, with tentative signals of benign intent opening the door to the moderation of rivalry. It ends in the constructivist world of discourse and identity change, with partner states generating new narratives and identities which blur the self/other distinctions that fuel rivalry. Along the way, international anarchy is transformed into international society and enemies turn into friends.

WHY STABLE PEACE BREAKS OUT

This chapter has thus far addressed how peace breaks out—the sequential process through which geopolitical rivalry gives way to stable peace. The analysis now turns to the question of when and why peace breaks out—the causal conditions under which enemies are able to escape geopolitical rivalry and find their way to lasting friendship. This effort to build a theory of stable peace proceeds with due modesty. The phenomenon under study is a very complex one, and the relevant theoretical literature is still evolving. Although the cases examined in this book constitute a representative subset of the universe of cases, they are by no means exhaustive. Mining the many cases not considered in this study could shed new light on the causes of stable peace. Moreover, each of the historical cases in this study is open to competing historical interpretations, preventing the drawing of definitive conclusions as to why stable peace breaks out.

These qualifications notwithstanding, the cases reveal that the onset of stable peace depends on the presence of three main ingredients—*institutionalized restraint*, *compatible social orders*, and *cultural commonality*. Institu-

⁵⁹ Bially Mattern, “The Power Politics of Identity,” p. 364.

tionalized restraint is a facilitating condition, whereas compatible social orders and cultural commonality are necessary conditions. The essential causal logic at work is as follows.

States that embrace institutionalized restraint possess domestic attributes that make them particularly well suited to pursue foreign policies of accommodation and partnership. Liberal democracies as well as non-democratic constitutional orders, because they institutionalize restraint and power-checking devices at home, are more likely than other regime types to practice strategic restraint in the conduct of their foreign policy. In addition, the transparency afforded by liberal order enables partner states to assess with confidence each other's intent, motivation, and political character. Institutionalized restraint is of particular importance during the first two phases of the onset of stable peace—unilateral accommodation and reciprocal restraint. It emerges as a facilitating rather than necessary condition because the cases will make clear that even states that do not embrace institutionalized restraint at home can nonetheless practice strategic restraint in the conduct of statecraft.

Compatibility of social orders is a permissive condition. When the political influence and economic interests of elite sectors in partner states are strengthened by reconciliation, they throw their support behind stable peace and advance its onset. In contrast, when partner states have incompatible social orders, reconciliation is usually blocked by political and economic constituencies threatened by integration. The compatibility of social orders is of particular importance during the third phase of the onset of stable peace—societal integration.

Cultural commonality plays an important role at both the outset and the completion of the process. At the outset, a preexisting sense of cultural affinity encourages potential partner states to contemplate the prospect of mutual accommodation and reconciliation. Such similarity prompts states to select each other as possible partners and to run the risks associated with accommodation. Cultural commonality plays a more prominent role in the final phase of the onset of stable peace—the embrace of a compatible, shared, or common identity. Public officials and opinion makers draw heavily on ethnic, racial, and religious ties in developing a narrative of friendship and kinship.

Figure 2.5 depicts these causal relationships. Institutionalized restraint, compatible social orders, and cultural commonality are now examined in greater depth.




FIGURE 2.5 Causal Conditions for Stable Peace

Institutionalized Restraint

The democratic peace school offers one of the more robust findings in international relations theory—that liberal democracies do not go to war with each other. It follows that liberal democracies may well be particularly suited to form zones of stable peace. Nonetheless, the relationship between regime type and stable peace is a complicated one. On the one hand, liberal democracies do appear to be better suited than other types of regimes to form international societies. On the other, liberal democracy is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition for stable peace. It is not sufficient inasmuch as liberal democracy does not automatically lead to stable peace—as ongoing geopolitical rivalry between Greece and Turkey makes clear. It is not necessary inasmuch as stable peace can break out in the absence of liberal democracy; the Concert of Europe, ASEAN, the Iroquois Confederation, the United Arab Emirates, a unified German Kingdom—these are all instances of stable peace that evolved in the absence of liberal democracy.

The causal linkage between democracy and interstate peace does not stand up to empirical scrutiny because it is the exercise of strategic restraint, not regime type per se, that is a necessary condition for stable peace. As discussed above, strategic restraint and the withholding of power are essential to sending signals of benign intent to potential partners—a critical first step in ameliorating geopolitical rivalry. To be sure, the practice of strategic restraint is regularly the product of the types of institutionalized restraint found among democracies—domestic checks on the executive associated with institutions

that distribute power among multiple centers of authority. States whose power is checked at home are more likely to practice strategic restraint in the conduct of their foreign policy. The mechanisms—constitutions, parliaments, courts—that constrain the power of elites with respect to domestic governance also apply to decision making on matters of statecraft.

But liberal democracies have no monopoly on institutionalized restraint. Non-democratic regimes often contain elements of constitutional restraint, thereby endowing them with some of the key attributes needed to pursue reconciliation and the elimination of rivalry. Indeed, even states that do not embrace institutionalized restraint at home can nonetheless be willing to practice strategic restraint in the conduct of their foreign relations, making clear that regime type alone does not determine when stable peace can break out.⁶⁰

This explication of the connection between institutionalized restraint and stable peace begins by examining why liberal democracies are better suited to build international society than other types of regimes. Thereafter, the analysis explores why non-democratic regimes are also able to fashion zones of stable peace.

Liberal democracy does not make states suited to stable peace simply by virtue of the fact that partner states identify each other as democratic. Rather, democracies exhibit regime attributes and types of behavior that give them a particular advantage in building stable peace. At work is not a sense of similarity or mutual identification as democracies, but specific capacities and behavioral characteristics that are the product of liberal institutions. Four key attributes, all aspects of institutionalized restraint, appear to be at work: the presence of power-checking political structures, transparency, the ability to make credible commitments, and policy adaptability.

First, a hallmark of liberal democracy is the presence of institutions that check and diffuse political power. States that possess such institutions are intrinsically more likely to practice strategic restraint than those that do not; in

⁶⁰ As some of the case studies will demonstrate, not only is liberal democracy not a necessary condition for stable peace, but the process of transition to liberal democracy can in fact pose threats to stable peace by encouraging nationalism and undermining the practice of strategic restraint. In this respect, states in the midst of regime change may be less suited to stable peace than either non-democratic regimes or mature democracies. See, in particular, the examination of the unraveling of the Concert of Europe in chapter 5. See also Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: Norton, 2000); and Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007).

the conduct of all aspects of policy, leaders are constrained by power-checking devices. In addition, leaders that are accustomed to adhering to a rules-based order at home are more likely to favor the establishment of a rules-based order internationally. The habits of political restraint are the habits of strategic restraint; in important respects, zones of peace represent the replication of norms and institutions of domestic governance at the level of interstate relations.

Second, liberal democracies are open and transparent polities, affording other states the opportunity to observe carefully decision-making processes and assess, with a relatively high degree of confidence, the intentions and motivations that inform behavior. Elections, legislative processes, polls and plebiscites, debate in the media—all these activities put on public view the strategic and political considerations that shape policy. The transparency that accompanies liberal democracy plays an important role in enabling rivals to back away from geopolitical competition; only when partner states are able to attribute benign behavior to benign intentions and motivation are they willing to let down their guard and begin taking the sequential steps that lead to stable peace. As Andrew Kydd observes, “If a democracy is really a security seeker, the openness of its policy processes will reveal this to the world.”⁶¹

Third, liberal democracies are well suited to make credible commitments, assuring potential partners that their declarations of benign intent are sincere. Elected leaders face “audience costs” if they fail to stand by their policies; electorates hold them accountable for fickle behavior.⁶² These domestic constraints give elites in other states confidence that declared policies will in fact be sustained over time. In addition, liberal democracy can promote the durability of stable peace by engaging broader publics in the process of reconciliation and partnership. Public engagement lends stable peace more robustness and credibility by making it less dependent upon a specific group of elites; regimes may come and go, but international society will endure if it has deeper civic roots, both in terms of societal interdependence and mutual identification.

The credibility of commitments is particularly important as a means of

⁶¹ Kydd, “Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing,” p. 119.

⁶² See James Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 3 (September 1994).

reducing the geopolitical consequence of power asymmetries.⁶³ The promise of institutionalized restraint reassures small states that they will not be taken advantage of as they let down their guard and pursue reconciliation with much larger partners. Small states are thereby less fearful that they will lose their autonomy as they cautiously adhere to the tacit understandings and explicit arrangements that accompany the onset of stable peace. Such reassurance is particularly important amid the formation of unions. Small states contemplating a political merger with a more powerful state as a matter of course fear absorption or annexation. The credible promise of strategic restraint by their preponderant partner reassures them that they will retain some measure of autonomy and voice even after the act of unification.

Fourth, the pluralism associated with liberal democracy enables states to handle more effectively the domestic political challenges that accompany the practice of strategic restraint. The onset of stable peace necessitates concessionary strategies and the toleration of vulnerability, posing considerable political risk to elites who pursue such policies. Especially in a geopolitical environment characterized by long-standing rivalry, hardliners usually stand at the ready to charge as weak and cowardly elites who adopt a strategy of accommodation.

The challenge for governing officials is to ensure that the *politics of accommodation* prevails over the *politics of humiliation*. Doing so requires that decision makers portray concessions as opportunities rather than necessities, making clear to domestic audiences that they are taking advantage of openings, not backing down under pressure. Effectively communicating the rationale and appropriateness of accommodation is easier to do in a liberal democracy for a number of reasons. Elites in democracies derive their legitimacy at least in part through representative government, making them less reliant on confrontational foreign policies to sustain their authority. Elite and public debate is more receptive and responsive to novel ideas and courses of action, increasing the likelihood that the arguments deployed in favor of concessions are able to challenge support for the status quo. Unlike in a unitary government, elites are also able to reach out to interest groups that benefit from reconciliation, enlisting their help in reorienting strategic debate. Finally, political pluralism makes it less likely that entrenched interests opposed to reconciliation will be able to serve as veto points, effectively blocking efforts to

⁶³ See Ikenberry, *After Victory*, pp. 50–79.

implement a strategy of accommodation. In sum, liberal democracies exhibit greater flexibility and adaptability than do unitary or fragmented polities, making democracies more conducive to strategic adjustment.⁶⁴

The pluralism inherent in liberal democracy facilitates not just strategic adjustment within each partner state, but also ideational convergence between them. The congruent interests and compatible identities that form a foundation for rapprochement require a measure of ideational convergence across the states in question. In order for rapprochement to evolve into security community and union, such convergence must extend further, enabling elites in partner states to reach agreement on order-producing rules. Such agreement is facilitated by the exchange of ideas and the degree to which elites move toward each other's positions. As Karl Deutsch and John Owen have both pointed out, liberalizing coalitions often form within and across national boundaries, providing a ready vehicle for cooperation and flows of information.⁶⁵ In contrast, authoritarian rule often inhibits pluralism and makes ideational convergence more fragile, generally limiting partnerships among non-democratic states to temporary marriages of convenience.

Although power-checking structures, transparency, the ability to make credible commitments, and adaptability may be more fully developed among liberal democracies, non-democracies that embrace institutionalized restraint are able to fashion zones of peace in large part because they exhibit many of these same attributes. For example, Piedmont and Prussia, although neither was a liberal democracy, succeeded in guiding Italy and Germany, respectively, to unification. Both had adopted constitutional rule after the revolutions of 1848, a move that helped reassure their less powerful neighbors that unification would mean consensual merger, not coercive exploitation. The constituent communities of the Iroquois Confederation were not liberal democracies, but tribal traditions of restraint and consensual governance practiced at the local level were replicated in the institutions of the union, effectively providing the makings of a constitutional order. These cases suggest

⁶⁴ See Hendrik Spruyt, *Ending Empire: Contested Sovereignty and Territorial Partition* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005). In his study of decolonization, Spruyt finds that pluralistic and less fragmented polities are better able to embrace the strategies of adjustment and adaptation needed to step back from imperial commitments. On the role that pluralism plays in enabling moderates to prevail against hardliners, see Joe Hagan, "Domestic Political Sources of Stable Peace: The Great Powers, 1815–1914," in Kacowicz et al., *Stable Peace Among Nations*.

⁶⁵ Deutsch, *Political Community*, pp. 176–178; and Owen, "Pieces of Stable Peace: A Pessimistic Constructivism."

that the key ingredient making stable peace possible is not popular control, but rather the willingness of governments to control themselves by embracing institutionalized restraint and the power-checking devices needed to reassure potential partners in peace.

The case studies also include a significant number of outliers—states that practice strategic restraint abroad despite the absence of institutionalized restraint at home. Russia, Prussia, and Austria during the Concert of Europe, the Soviet Union and China during the 1950s, Indonesia in 1966, Brazil in 1979—these are all instances in which absolutist regimes embarked down the path toward stable peace. As the case studies will reveal, when faced with strategic imperatives or compelling domestic incentives, even autocratic regimes that do not exercise political restraint at home are capable of practicing strategic restraint in the conduct of their foreign policy.

These findings are consistent with recent scholarship that challenges the supposition that only elected leaders are constrained by “audience costs”—the need to demonstrate credibility and competence to their citizens. Democratic accountability, the argument runs, strengthens the ability of elected officials to make credible commitments and demonstrate resolve.⁶⁶ Audience costs thus help states convey predictable intentions to others—as discussed above, a key asset when states seek to send signals of benign motivation and develop the practice of reciprocal restraint. But as Jessica Weeks argues—and as the cases in the following chapters demonstrate—it is not the case that “members of domestic audiences in democratic regimes are on average more likely to value credibility or competence than audiences in various types of autocratic regimes.” On the contrary, Weeks contends, “most authoritarian leaders require the support of domestic elites who act as audiences in much the same way as voting publics in democracies.”⁶⁷ Authoritarian and democratic leaders alike are thus subject to audience costs that enhance their capacity to make commitments and demonstrate resolve.

The literature on audience costs has tended to focus only on their relationship to the credibility of threats. But as Weeks appropriately points out, “Just as leaders may generate domestic costs by backing down from a threat, they can also incur costs by renegeing on peaceful promises such as commitments not to invade neighboring states. Thus, higher audience costs may alleviate

⁶⁶ See Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes.”

⁶⁷ Jessica Weeks, “Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve,” *International Organization* 62, no. 1 (Winter 2008): 42, 36.

the security dilemma by reducing uncertainty about whether a promise to keep peace is genuine.”⁶⁸ Indeed, cases such as rapprochement between Brazil and Argentina and the onset of ASEAN make clear that, even among military dictatorships, domestic audience costs can play an important role in advancing stable peace. Weeks’s two important amendments to this literature thus help explain why autocracies, and not only liberal democracies, can be reliable members of a zone of peace. As discussed in the concluding chapter, these findings caution against overweighting the causal importance of regime type in explaining the onset of stable peace.

Compatible Social Orders

Compatible social orders constitute a second key ingredient of stable peace.⁶⁹ Such compatibility is a function of three main dimensions of social order: the distribution of political power among different classes; the distribution of political power among different ethnic, racial, and religious groups; and the organizing principles of economic production and commercial activity. When the onset of stable peace reaches the phase of societal integration, the dominant social sectors in the partner states begin to interact with each other. When social orders are similar, societal integration advances the political and economic interests of these dominant sectors—and the onset of stable peace proceeds apace. When social orders are incompatible, societal integration threatens and undermines the political and economic interests of these dominant sectors—and they consequently step in to arrest the advance of stable peace. The process of societal integration and reconciliation then begins again only if and when social convergence removes such domestic obstacles.

Integration between a state dominated by its aristocracy and one with an egalitarian society is likely to stall as the aristocracy’s privileged position is threatened by a partner state in which power is not based on class. Increasing interaction between capitalist and socialist countries, agrarian and industrial polities, and open and closed economies similarly pits dominant social sectors against each other, creating powerful impediments to the onset of stable peace. In general terms, elites whose political power and economic privilege

⁶⁸ Weeks, “Autocratic Audience Costs,” p. 60.

⁶⁹ See David Skidmore, ed., *Contested Social Orders and International Politics* (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1997).

are based on a given social order will resist forms and levels of political and economic integration that threaten to overturn that order.

Incompatibilities in social order do not prevent states from embarking down the path of stable peace. Rather, the societal obstacles to stable peace intensify as political and economic integration proceeds. The Soviet Union and China fashioned a close partnership during the 1950s. But the conflicting social demands and ideological tensions that divided an industrializing Russia from an agrarian China would, by the end of the decade, contribute to its demise. Unions between Egypt and Syria and between Senegal and Gambia got off the ground, but both soon foundered over differences in social order and disputes over tariffs and trade. Union between Malaysia and Singapore similarly fell prey to differences in social order, with the predominantly Chinese population of Singapore upsetting the delicate ethnic balance in Malaysia. Even among democracies, divergences in social orders imperil stable peace. The United States, for example, suffered a bloody civil war as a result of the incompatible social orders of its north and south. Liberal democracy is no guarantor of political harmony in the face of potent social cleavages.

Changes in social order can have an important impact on the prospects for stable peace. The Concert of Europe functioned as a successful security community for over three decades—despite the fact that it consisted of two liberalizing countries (Britain and France) intent on consolidating constitutional monarchy, and three conservative regimes (Austria, Prussia, and Russia) determined to safeguard absolute rule. Differences in regime type were offset by the fact that all five countries were dominated by an aristocratic elite, each of which agreed not to interfere in the domestic affairs of other member states. The Concert, however, eventually became the victim of social divergence. Differential rates of commercialization and industrialization—and contrasting state responses to the rise of middle and working classes—led to a widening social and political gap between the Concert's liberalizing members and its absolutist ones. The revolutions of 1848 brought this divergence to the fore, overturning the political status quo and effectively bringing the Concert to an end. So too was it social change that eventually brought civil war to the United States. During the country's early decades, a rough political equilibrium between the North and South contained the divisive potential of the two region's differences over slavery and the desirability of urbanization and industrialization. As westward expansion and the North's faster growth in

population and wealth upset the political balance, however, union proved no match for diverging social orders.

In similar fashion, social convergence can advance the prospects for stable peace. During the first half of the nineteenth century, efforts to promote political and economic integration among a multitude of Germanic states were stymied by the diverging interests of the more commercial north and the more agrarian south. As commercialization spread to southern states, however, the interests of their political and economic elite converged with those in the north, helping clear the way for the founding of the German Kingdom in 1871. Incompatibilities in social order were a potent obstacle to societal integration, whereas convergence in social order then facilitated the onset and consolidation of stable peace.

Cultural Commonality

Cultural commonality is the third key ingredient of stable peace. Culture refers to a repertoire of practices, significations, and symbols that arises primarily, although not exclusively, from ethnicity, race, and religion. The historical cases indicate that perceptions of cultural affinity guide states toward each other; cultural commonality conditions which polities seek each other out as they search for an enemy that could potentially become a friend. The role played by cultural commonality is akin to social selection. When geopolitical necessity prompts states to seek to befriend an adversary, that state usually targets a party with which it enjoys an overlapping network of cultural practices and symbols. A preexisting sense of commonality appears to act as a marker, giving both states an initial inkling that they may be able to step away from geopolitical rivalry.⁷⁰ Cultural affinity also plays an important role in the later phases of the onset of stable peace. As societal integration proceeds and elites in partner states seek to generate a new narrative that blurs self/other distinctions, cultural commonality provides ready ground for the fashioning of a compatible, shared, or common identity. These findings are very much consistent with Hedley Bull's conclusion that "a common feature of . . . international societies is that they were all founded upon a com-

⁷⁰ See Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein, "Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism," *International Organization* 56, no. 3 (Summer 2002).

mon culture or civilization.”⁷¹ Bruce Cronin agrees that transnational communities require a “shared characteristic,” such as a common ethnicity, to help shape “social identities that transcend juridical boundaries.”⁷²

Instances of stable peace are most often found among states that enjoy cultural commonality. Rapprochement succeeded between Great Britain and the United States—in part due to the sense of affinity resulting from a common Anglo-Saxon heritage. In contrast, rapprochement between Great Britain and Japan failed—in part due to an estrangement stemming from racial differences. Successful security communities tend to be culturally homogenous. The Concert of Europe and the European Community both benefited from narratives of cultural and religious commonality. In contrast, Australia and New Zealand have been excluded from ASEAN—despite their strategic proximity to the grouping—primarily because their dominant populations are not of Asian extraction. In similar fashion, stable unions tend to run along cultural lines—the United States, Italy, the Iroquois Confederation, and the United Arab Emirates are cases in point. In contrast, the Swiss Confederation was repeatedly tested by conflict between its Catholics and Protestants. Switzerland found its way to stable peace only after the military defeat of Catholic cantons seeking secession in the 1840s and the arrival of a liberal variant of nationalism associated with the revolutions of 1848. Rivalry between ethnic Malays and ethnic Chinese contributed to the unraveling of union between Singapore and Malaysia. In general, unions that cut across cultural boundaries often face chronic instability, at times breaking up along cultural dividing lines, as made clear by the recent fates of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

Notably, linguistic dividing lines appear to be much less important than ethnic, racial, and religious ones. Linguistic commonality does help facilitate the deepening of international society and the construction of national states, as examination of the unification of the United States, Germany, and the United Arab Emirates makes clear. But the cases of the Concert of Europe, ASEAN, and the EC, among others, also demonstrate that language differences do not stand in the way of stable peace. And in instances in which the deepening of peace falls prey to the return of geopolitical rivalry, such as the

⁷¹ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, p. 16.

⁷² Cronin, *Community Under Anarchy*, pp. 31–32.

Sino-Soviet and Swiss cases, linguistic differences were not the cause of dissolution.

In exploring the mechanisms through which ethnic, racial, and religious linkages contribute to stable peace, Durkheim's notion of social solidarity sheds important light. Durkheim distinguishes between primitive types of communities and those that are more mature. Primitive communities are held together by mechanical solidarity, a uniformity stemming from similarity. Mature communities enjoy organic solidarity, which stems from different social units working together in a complementary fashion. Mechanical and organic solidarity are sequentially linked. In Durkheim's words, "For social units to be able to differentiate from one another, they must first be attracted or grouped together through the similarities they display. . . . We know in fact that higher societies are the result of the coming together of lower societies of the same type. . . . It is in this way that more complex organisms are formed by the replication of more simple organisms, similar to one another, which only differentiate after they have been associated together."⁷³ Economic interdependence, Durkheim adds, promotes social solidarity only when it operates in the presence of commonality and affinity.

Inasmuch as international society represents a nascent or primitive form of community, its solidarity tends to be mechanical rather than organic in nature. Cultural affinity is a background condition that helps make solidarity possible and ensures that growing interdependence enhances not just wealth but also social bonds. As zones of stable peace mature, the solidarity they enjoy matures in step, with more complex social bonds arising from differentiation rather than uniformity. But in its early phases, stable peace often relies on cultural commonality as a primary source of social affinity.

An important caveat must condition this theoretical claim about the direct link between cultural affinity and stable peace. What constitutes cultural commonality is admittedly open to political and social construction. Through political and social change as well as shifts in discourse, cultural others can become kin, and kin can become cultural others. For centuries, Europe's geopolitical fault lines paralleled religious cleavages. Today, Europe's Catholics and Protestants (with some notable exceptions) enjoy a stable social solidarity. During the 1800s, Sweden was Norway's primary other. Today, they both embrace a common Nordic identity. Over the course of the 1990s, the com-

⁷³ Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, p. 219.

munal identity once enjoyed by Yugoslavs was lost to the reawakening of ethnic rivalries.

Despite the malleability of the notion of cultural affinity, social construction does run up against what Ernest Gellner calls “entropy-resistant traits.” “A classification is entropy-resistant,” Gellner writes, “if it is based on an attribute which has a marked tendency *not* to become, even with the passage of time . . . evenly distributed throughout the entire society.”⁷⁴ Conceptions of ethnicity, race, and religion may be malleable, but only to a certain degree. Convincing Frenchmen that they share a common heritage with Germans was difficult enough. Convincing Frenchmen of their cultural affinity with Turks is another matter altogether. Over the course of the twentieth century, a security community between the United States and Canada evolved more quickly and extensively than between the United States and Mexico. Ethnic differences and identity politics played a major role.⁷⁵

The point here is not that ethnicity, race, and religion should be seen as indelible determinants of where stable peace has a chance of taking root. Today’s cultural dividing lines could become tomorrow’s historical artifacts. On the other hand, it would be illusory to dismiss the important role that cultural similarity plays in enabling states to back away from geopolitical competition and build international society. Although perceptions of cultural commonality and difference are often mediated by public discourse, which narratives of commonality are privileged over others is a function of their availability. Britain successfully pursued lasting rapprochement with the United States rather than with Japan in part because of the ready availability of a narrative of Anglo-Saxon unity. The Iroquois Confederation consisted only of Iroquois tribes partly due to their proximity, but also as a result of cultural affinity. Despite the malleability of perceptions of cultural affinity, ethnic, racial, and religious similarity remains a reliable predictor of where zones of stable peace are likely to form and endure.

Although this analysis places considerable weight on cultural factors, it is quite distinct from Samuel Huntington’s work on the clash of civilizations.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 64.

⁷⁵ See Guadalupe Gonzalez and Stephan Haggard, “The United States and Mexico: A Pluralistic Security Community?” in Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*, p. 326.

⁷⁶ Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchstone, 1996).

In step with Huntington, this book recognizes the geopolitical import of civilizational dividing lines. But whereas Huntington stresses that different civilizations are destined to clash, the argument here is quite different—states that share cultural commonality are uniquely positioned to enjoy stable peace. This finding has important prescriptive implications, suggesting that attempts to construct and preserve zones of peace will be most successful when such zones parallel—as opposed to cut across—cultural groupings. If Turkey is to invest in building international society, its natural partners may be its neighbors in the Middle East rather than those in the European Union. If East Asia is ultimately to enjoy a security community similar to the one that has evolved in Europe, states of the region—China and Japan, for example—may well be a more suitable anchor than the United States.⁷⁷

Triggering Conditions

Institutionalized restraint, compatible social orders, and cultural commonality lay a foundation for stable peace, but they are not sufficient conditions; stable peace does not automatically emerge whenever they are present. Accordingly, a final issue concerns the triggering conditions that induce the onset of stable peace. What factors activate the processes of reconciliation spelled out in the first half of this chapter?

Three conditions appear to help trigger the onset of stable peace. The first, alluded to throughout this chapter, is geopolitical necessity. The state that initiates the effort to back away from rivalry does not do so out of altruism. Rather, it faces a threatening environment and lacks the resources needed to

⁷⁷ The pathways through which institutionalized restraint, compatible social orders, and cultural commonality facilitate stable peace are often intertwined. In the case of rapprochement between Norway and Sweden, for example, political reform at once introduced institutionalized restraint and led to a convergence in social order by diminishing the power of Sweden's aristocracy. These changes in turn helped clear the way for a new narrative that stressed cultural bonds between the two countries. In the Anglo-American case, political reform enhanced institutionalized restraint in Britain by strengthening the power of Parliament. But it also led to a convergence in social order by weakening the influence of Britain's aristocracy—a stronghold of anti-American sentiment. Singapore's separation from Malaysia was on the surface the product of cultural difference—tension between ethnic Chinese and ethnic Malays. But the split was ultimately a question of social order—the balance of power between Chinese and Malays—not one of ethnic difference. Cultural difference played a more prominent role at the regional level, where ASEAN excluded Australia and New Zealand from membership primarily because much of their population was of European rather than Asian extraction.

deal adequately with those threats. Its effort to befriend an existing adversary is a product of necessity, not opportunity.

A second triggering condition, often but not always present, is the existence of a preponderant state that anchors the zone of peace. As Karl Deutsch hypothesized, security communities tend to take shape around cores of strength. The most powerful party in a region is not always the instigator of stable peace, but it must be willing to exercise strategic restraint and entertain the prospect of reconciliation if stable peace is to have a chance. If the dominant state remains confrontational, its weaker neighbors tend to band together in alliance, meaning that the logic of balancing amid international anarchy prevails over the logic of “grouping” amid international society. If the predominant power practices strategic restraint and gives up some of the advantages of its material superiority, its weaker neighbors have a compelling incentive to let down their guard and risk investing in stable peace.

A third triggering condition is policy entrepreneurship. Elites that pursue stable peace must “run the gauntlet,” accepting the risks associated with accommodation and the strategic and political vulnerabilities that result. Often, such entrepreneurship comes about in the wake of regime change and the opportunities it affords for a marked change of course. It was a change of government in Sweden and its willingness to pursue political reform that paved the way for rapprochement with Norway. Indonesia ended its policy of *konfrontasi* only after the demise of the Sukarno regime and the rise to power of General Suharto. In other cases, seminal events, such as war and revolution, provided the impetus behind a new and risky brand of statecraft. The Concert of Europe emerged in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars. The Iran-Iraq War cleared the way for the founding of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The Revolutionary War that began in 1775 triggered union among the American colonies, while the revolutions of 1848 put both Italy and Germany on the pathway to unification. Although an intrinsic randomness governs the timing of the events that encourage entrepreneurship, regime change and policy innovation often occur amid the periods of reevaluation and realignment that follow political crisis or military conflict.⁷⁸

⁷⁸ On the role that critical junctures can play in producing policy innovation, see Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002); and G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” *International Organization* 44, no. 3 (Summer 1990).

THEORIZING A CONTINUUM OF STABLE PEACE AND ITS BREAKDOWN

Rapprochement, security community, and union represent different stages along a continuum of stable peace. As partner states move along this continuum, their interests evolve from being congruent, to conjoined, to unitary, and their identities from being compatible, to shared, to common. In addition, practices of self-binding and co-binding become more regularized and institutionalized as zones of peace mature. Rapprochement is more about practice than institutions. The parties succeed in reaching a state of peaceful coexistence, but cooperation takes the form of self-binding rather than co-binding and is regularized but not institutionalized. Security communities advance beyond peaceful coexistence; they represent a more evolved type of international society that rests upon an articulated and institutionalized set of order-producing rules. A union goes one step further, establishing supra-state institutions to which constituent members cede their sovereignty as they seek to act as a single unit on the international stage.

This study does not advance a theory of when and why states advance along this continuum; this topic is left for future research. Rather, it offers a generalized account of the sequential process that leads to stable peace and the conditions that facilitate its onset. Nonetheless, the case studies do provide a number of leads as to the potential determinants of progression from rapprochement to security community to union. The following discussion of these leads consists of observations and reflections, not empirically confirmed findings.

Rapprochement is the result of a spontaneous reaction to strategic necessity. At the outset, it is first and foremost an effort to redress strategic deficiencies; the prospect of building stable peace materializes only as reconciliation proceeds. In this sense, rapprochement is the consequence of tentative efforts to use diplomacy to neutralize a threat, which, when successful, then open up the possibility of a more profound change in relations. When in 1896 London decided to accommodate Washington's demands in a dispute over the border between British Guiana and Venezuela, it was seeking only to reduce its commitments in the Western Hemisphere, not make a lasting partner of the United States. When Sweden chose not to invade Norway in 1905, it was responding to immediate strategic circumstances, not yet pursuing stable peace with its neighbor. Rapprochement is by no means accidental, but nei-

ther is it the result of a fully articulated strategic vision; it emerges incrementally as geopolitical rivalry wanes.

In contrast, security community and union are the products of foresight and strategic vision; elites from the outset have as their objective a rules-based order and the potential emergence of a zone of peace. It is for this reason that an initial episode of rapprochement usually precedes the onset of security community and union; a cooperative, rules-based order becomes imaginable only as rivals back away from geopolitical competition. Not until long after the consolidation of Anglo-American rapprochement in the early 1900s could elites in both the United States and Britain contemplate a transatlantic security community. That development arguably awaited the Atlantic Charter fashioned by Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill in the summer of 1941. Rapprochement between Indonesia and Malaysia cleared the way for the founding of ASEAN, just as rapprochement between France and Germany and between Abu Dhabi and Dubai was a precondition for the establishment of the EC and the UAE, respectively.

Once rapprochement offers a foundation for imagining the establishment of a rules-based order, several conditions appear to play a role in determining whether rapprochement then advances only to security community or all the way to union. Security communities are more likely among groupings that cover a large territorial expanse and exhibit greater diversity as to culture, language, and regime type. The Concert of Europe and ASEAN are examples. The size of their member states, their diverse languages, and differences in regime type required the pluralism afforded by security community. Unions tend to form among groupings that are smaller in size and exhibit less diversity as to culture, language, and regime type. The UAE, the Iroquois Confederation, Germany, and Italy are examples. The United States is a notable exception due to the size of its territory, but it does exhibit homogeneity as to culture and regime type. It is also the case that unions that are culturally and linguistically diverse are more prone to instability than those that are more homogeneous. Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Canada, and Belgium are cases in point.

Political culture and the intensity of attachments to sovereignty may also play a role in determining how far particular groupings of states advance along the continuum of stable peace. Despite the formal act of union in 1789, the United States took decades to evolve into a centralized federal state; amid a libertarian political culture, the separate states slowly and reluctantly de-

volved power to Washington. That same political culture ensures that the transatlantic community is unlikely to progress beyond a loose security community; the United States would be loath to accept the formal attenuation of sovereignty entailed, for example, in today's European Union. In contrast, a more communitarian political culture eased the process of state formation in Europe. Germany more readily cohered as a federal union than did the United States, and Italy formed as a unitary state from the outset. Less intense attachments to sovereignty help explain why the EU has been evolving gradually from a security community into a union.

As to what factors are responsible for movement along the continuum from security community to union, societal interaction and economic integration appear to be the dominant drivers. Societal interaction, new transportation and communication infrastructure, and growing social networks all help shared identities become a common identity. Economic integration advances economic interdependence, providing both public and private sectors new incentives for advancing from security community to union. From this perspective, although Deutsch appears to have erred in attributing the formation of zones of peace to societal interaction, his transactional account does appear to provide a compelling explanation of when and why security communities may evolve into unions.

An increase in external threat can play a role in inducing security communities to consolidate into unions.⁷⁹ But it can also have the opposite effect. Among security communities with sufficient capability to address external threats through internal mobilization, such threats appear to lead to consolidation. Among security communities that must rely on outside powers to meet external threats, such threats have the potential to weaken internal cohesion.

The unification of Italy and Germany occurred amid wars against foreign powers—wars that were orchestrated by Italian and German leaders in the name of national unity. The founding of the United States resulted from the Revolutionary War, and the consolidation of the federal government's size and authority then substantially advanced by America's rise as a major power during the nineteenth century and the geopolitical contests that followed. In

⁷⁹ On the relationship between international competition and the centralization of states, see Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); and Deudney, *Bounding Power*, especially pp. 175–176.

these cases, the constituent states of Italy, Germany, and the United States were able to amass military strength sufficient to prevail against their respective external challengers. In contrast, the GCC was weakened by the rising threat from Iran and Iraq after 1990; rather than advancing to union, the GCC's prior progress toward security community was compromised as its members, unable to confront Iraq and Iran on their own, sought external protection from the United States. In similar fashion, the Iroquois Confederation, although at times strengthened by external threat, was ultimately split asunder by internal disagreements about whether to ally with the American colonies or the British during the Revolutionary War.

Theorizing about a continuum of stable peace necessitates consideration of backward as well as forward movement along the continuum. The GCC's backsliding, the demise of the Iroquois Confederation, the unraveling of Sino-Soviet rapprochement—these and other cases of failure broach the question of how and why zones of stable peace break down.⁸⁰ The theoretical framework developed in this chapter has focused exclusively on how and when stable peace breaks out. There is, however, no need for a separate theoretical discussion of instances of stable peace that either stall as they form or unravel soon after they materialize. Rather, the historical episodes of failure are used to elaborate and extend the basic theoretical model that explains the onset of stable peace. The unraveling of stable peace follows the same causal pathway spelled out above, but the process operates in reverse; narratives of opposition trigger societal separation, which in turn awakens the security dilemma, reciprocal strategies of competition, and the return of geopolitical rivalry. On the question of when stable peace unravels, it is the absence of the key ingredients identified above—institutionalized restraint, compatible social orders, and cultural commonality—that explains why.

Notably, social and cultural tensions, not geopolitical ones, instigate the

⁸⁰ This account of the relationship among the three stages of stable peace is far more contingent and complex than the relationship Alexander Wendt posits among analogous stages of anarchy (see note 4 above). Wendt suggests that the international system will not regress—for example, from a Lockean anarchy to a Hobbesian one. He also contends that due to the human need for recognition and the growing costs of war, primitive and more violent anarchies are less stable than mature and peaceful ones. Accordingly, the international system will tend to progress toward a peaceful world state. The empirical cases explored in this book cast doubt on such a teleological view of the prospects for global peace. History suggests that progression from early to more advanced stages of stable peace is by no means necessary and that regression from stable peace back to enmity is possible, if not common. See Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, pp. 310–312; and Wendt, “Why a World State Is Inevitable.”

unraveling of zones of peace. It is only after the awakening of political tensions stemming from cultural and social differences that geopolitical competition commences. The U.S. Civil War was initially prompted not by territorial disputes between North and South, but by differences over slavery and the desirability of agrarian versus industrial development. The succession of civil wars that plagued the Swiss Confederation was the result of social tensions between rural and urban cantons and religious disputes between Catholics and Protestants. The unraveling of Sino-Soviet partnership in the late 1950s originated from clashes over ideology, which only later awakened security competition. The United Arab Republic collapsed because Egypt succeeded in alienating all of Syria's elite sectors, prompting them to support a military-led coup against the union. The Concert of Europe unraveled as a result of the revolutions of 1848—a contagion of upheaval wrought by modernization and social change. In all of these cases, the geopolitical competition that marked the collapse of stable peace can be traced back to social and cultural separation.

The main exceptions to this generalization are cases of failure resulting from divergent perceptions of how best to respond to external threats. America's Revolutionary War broke apart the Iroquois Confederation as its members could not reach consensus on what side to take. The GCC was stymied by diverging perceptions of the necessity and desirability of reliance on U.S. power to check Iraq and Iran. Even in these cases, the breakdown of stable peace was not a direct function of geopolitical rivalry. Rather, different responses to external events awakened identities of opposition and divergence in policy, which in turn led to a return of geopolitical rivalry. ASEAN has had the potential to suffer a similar fate—but its members have not faced an external threat sufficiently acute to bring to the surface divergent threat perceptions or necessitate strategic dependence on outside powers.

These insights provide cautionary admonitions about the fragility of zones of peace. Even after geopolitical competition and territorial issues have been resolved, stable peace may nonetheless falter as the result of differences over social and cultural issues or divergent responses to external threats. As discussed in the concluding chapter, this finding warns against complacency about the durability of existing zones of peace and underscores the potential for disputes over social issues and divergent responses to external threats to escalate into conflicts of geopolitical consequence.